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Abstract 
 
The victory over Axis forces by the Red Army during the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942-1943 
is considered one of the major turning points of World War Two. General Vasily Chuikov 
and the men of the 62nd Army, supported by General Alexander Rodimtsev’s 13th Guards 
Division, were trapped inside the city, where fighting   amongst the bombed-out ruins at 
times consisted of hand-to-hand combat with only knives and spades as weapons. The 
German forces attacked Stalingrad with double the infantry the defenders possessed, three 
times their strength in artillery, five times as many tanks, and were supported by 
overwhelming air power, but the brilliant military tactics of General Georgy Zhukov enabled 
the Soviet armies outside Stalingrad to eventually encircle the yet undefeated German 6th 
Army.   
 
     Constrained by Soviet politics from its inception in 1918, and later by the paranoid 
psychology of the tyrannical leader Joseph Stalin, the men and women of the Red Army 
struggled to survive an inadequate system, with low pay and poor housing, and they often 
went untrained. Due to Stalin’s ruthlessness in his desire to stay in power as Secretary of the 
Soviet Union and Soviet Premier, everyone, including ordinary citizens, peasants, and 
important politicians became victims of his wrath, and the military was certainly no 
exception. During the 1930s, the Red Army High Command was purged in its thousands, 
with the result being the loss of many highly experienced officers.  
 
       This thesis will discuss and analyses the Red Army’s background from 1918, to its 
position in 1941, when German and Axis forces invaded the Soviet Union in a covert 
manoeuvre codenamed Operation Barbarossa. It will explain the occurrences that changed 
the Red Army from an untrained, undisciplined, purged, ill-equipped, and dispirited entity, to 
gain the victory at the battle of Stalingrad.  
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1 
Introduction 
The first commandment of every victorious revolution as Marx and Engels 
repeatedly emphasised, was to smash the old army, dissolve it and replace it by a 
new one. A new social class when rising to power never could, and cannot now, 
attain power and consolidate it except by completely disintegrating the old army. 
(“Disorganisation!” the reactionary or just cowardly philistines have on this score), 
except by passing through a most difficult and painful period without any army, (the 
great French Revolution also passed through such a painful period), and by gradually 
building up, in the midst of hard civil war a new army, a new discipline, a new 
military organization of the new class.    
Vladimir Lenin
1 
 
The Red Army of the new Soviet Union was to be an army of a different sort, that is, 
different to the former Imperialist Army of Tsar Nicolas II, where the privileged 
ruled and the oppressed served. Bolshevik revolutionary leader Vladimir Lenin 
wanted to end three hundred years of Imperial Russian military heritage by forming a 
totally ‘new army’ that would carry Marxist revolutionary ideals and would serve 
and protect the people from foreign and class enemies. His initial utopian vision of 
brotherhood and internal democracy within the Red Army proved unrealistic in the 
heat of battle because in itself the system created a lack of discipline and 
organisation in the ranks. By 1941 the institution had fallen away from much of its 
original Bolshevik ethics, and by the time of the German invasion of the Soviet  
 
                                                           
1 Vladimir I. Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960) Pp.92-93  
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Union, during Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, the Red Army had become an 
establishment similar to the Imperial Army that Lenin had so earnestly tried to 
distance it from. The officers once again lost touch with the common soldiers and the 
army became a harsh institution dominated by sergeants and senior officers who 
abused their inferiors. It had developed into an organisation based on lies and deceit, 
largely due to the totalitarian dictatorship of Joseph Stalin who was the Secretary of 
the Communist Party from 1922, and Premier of the Soviet Union from 6 May 1941 
until his death on 5 March 1953.  
  
     The Russian town of Tsaritsyn was renamed Stalingrad after Stalin in 1925 and 
was known as such until 1961 when it was again renamed Volgograd. One of the 
first things that come to mind when we think of this town is the famous battle that 
occurred between the Soviet Union’s Red Army and the Axis forces during World 
War Two. This battle was one of the bloodiest ever fought and arguably the most 
important of the war. During the battle the Red Army soldiers became urban guerrilla 
fighters, holding onto the Soviet leader’s namesake and slowly regaining one 
battered building at a time despite the intense German onslaught raging around them 
on every side. Civilian men, women and children stood by the Red Army helping in 
whatever way they could, despite being caught up in the near total destruction of the 
town by the invading forces. They continued to work in the factories while the city of 
Stalingrad was reduced to rubble, repairing ferries and gunboats, producing guns, 
ammunition, and tanks, which they sometimes drove straight from the factory to the 
battlefield themselves. More civilians died in the Battle of Stalingrad than those  
killed in the bombings of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with only 1,500 surviving  
3 
from the original half a million population.
2 The Red Army lost 750,000 troops but 
despite the carnage, the Battle of Stalingrad was a mighty victory for the Soviets, 
who eventually sent the Germans into retreat, initiating a beginning to the end of 
World War Two in Europe. The victory of the Red Army at the Battle of Stalingrad 
is considered to be a major turning point in the defeat of Nazi Germany during World 
War Two.  
 
     Although the Red Army totally and victoriously defeated the German onslaught 
by 31 January 1943, it had not always been in the position to achieve such triumph 
and glory. Indeed, only months before Field-Marshal Friedrich Paulus, Commander 
of the infamous German 6th Army surrendered, elements of the Red Army had 
almost been annihilated. In fact, the soldiers of the Red Army had been in a very 
precarious position for quite some time before the Battle of Stalingrad and at various 
times during the invasion by the German forces.   
 
     This thesis is an analysis of the changes that occurred within the Red Army that 
turned it from an unstable, undisciplined, poorly trained, and ill-equipped force that 
was low on morale and spirit at the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union, to the victorious and resilient contingent that thoroughly and irrevocably 
defeated the Axis powers. The Red Army had been weakened and dispirited by the 
military purges of the late 1930s, early 1940s, losing thousands of good experienced 
officers, and also some of their brilliant military tactics, such as Marshal Mikhail 
Tukhachevsky’s  theory of ‘deep battle.’ The Red Army was totally humiliated  
                                                           
2 “Battle of Stalingrad.” Narr. David Glantz. History Channel. Foxtel. 16 June. 2012. Television Programme.  
4 
during the Winter War with Finland due to a lack of organisation, proper equipment, 
and skilled leadership, and  it was unprepared for total war at the beginning of the 
covert German invasion in 1941, which was the largest force ever assembled in a 
war. Deflated, and ill-equipped the men and women of the Red Army were almost 
annihilated during the first year, being captured and killed in their hundreds of 
thousands. Hitler thought that it would only be matter of months before the whole of 
the Soviet Union and her territories were under German subjugation, due to the 
inferiority of its fighting force. The focus of this thesis is how the Red Army rose up 
and was able to defeat such an overbearing, and superior enemy during the battle of 
Stalingrad, and the circumstances which enabled such a dramatic shift in power will 
also be discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5 
Chapter 1 
 
An Army of a New Kind  
 
After the February Russian Revolution of 1917 by the Socialist Revolutionary Party 
and the abdication of Tsar Nikolas II on 13 March the Russian Provisional 
Government was formed. It was led by Prince George Lvov with Alexander 
Kerensky as Minister of Justice, who also became Minister for War in May of the 
same year. Lvov, being unpopular with the people due to his unwillingness to 
withdraw Russia from World War One, resigned, leaving Kerensky in the leadership 
position. Kerensky was also an advocate for continuing the war against the Central 
Powers,
3 and his government refused to give land to the poor peasants in the rural 
areas making him just as unpopular. Due to disorganisation and fighting within the 
army, thousands of soldiers deserted often taking their weapons with them. Kerensky 
and his government under threat from their own army in September of 1917 had to 
call upon the Bolsheviks and their Red Guards to protect them in Petrograd, handing 
over 40,000 rifles to them. Lacking the people’s support, Kerensky’s new 
government was eventually overthrown on 7 October 1917 by the much larger forces 
of Lenin’s Red Guards, who also had the support of the Petrograd Soviet Workers’ 
and Soldiers’ Deputies.
 4  
 
     The Soviets’ first military force was completely voluntary and was drawn from 
the working class who were staunch in their defence of the revolution. By July 1917, 
before the October Revolution, Lenin had 10,000 Red Guards (paramilitary  
                                                           
3 The Central Powers consisted of Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria. 
“Central Powers,” The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 3, 1994. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.)P.30  
4 Martin Miller, Ed. The Russian Revolution: The Essential Readings (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) P.34  
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volunteers recommended by the Bolsheviks) armed with rifles in the Petrograd 
factories.
5 The Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies issued Order 
Number One in March 1917. The seven-article order encouraged front-line soldiers 
to elect committees to represent themselves against the authority of the officers and 
not to surrender their arms.
6 Soldiers refused to obey orders unless approved by their 
committees causing the army to take on democratic ideals.
7 The officers hold on their 
men became weak and discipline deteriorated, with a high incidence of desertion. 
This unintentionally helped the Bolsheviks’ agitation, despite the current Tsarist 
army not being answerable to them at the time. 
 
     After their victory, the Soviets established the All- Russian Extraordinary 
Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, Checka
8 
(chrezvychaynaya komissiya); on 20 December to harass any opponents to Soviet 
rule. This organisation was the early forerunner to the People’s Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs or NKVD (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del) from which the 
KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti) eventually emerged. The Tsars’ army, 
which had been made up of mainly anti-communists, exhausted by the ravages of 
World War One, had collapsed, making it easier for the Soviets to totally abolish it in 
favour of a new military loyal to Marxist ideals. This new army was called the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army or RKKA (Raboche- krest’yanskaya krasnaya 
armiya), and was formed on 28 January 1918 by the Council of People’s Commissars  
                                                           
5 Petrograd had been called Saint Petersburg until 1914, and was the Imperial Capital of Russia. In 1918 the Central government 
bodies moved to Moscow. After Lenin’s death in 1924 Petrograd was changed to Leningrad. In 1991, after the fall of 
Communism in the Soviet Union, it reverted back to Saint Petersburg. “Saint Petersburg,” The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Volume 10, 1994. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.) P. 332 
6 “Order No. I of the Petrograd Soviet, March 14, 1917.” Lillian Goldman Law Library. Yale Law School. The Avalon Project: 
Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy.  2008, 23 Sept. 2012 See Appendix Number One. 
http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/20thcentury/soviet001.asp  
7 Roger R. Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 (London: Routledge, 2000) P. 2 
8 Ibid, P. 35  
7 
(Sovnarkom), of which Leon Trotsky was the Chairman. He had also been voted in 
as Commissar of Foreign Affairs on 26 October 1917. The civilian leadership of the 
Red Army however soon realised that the enormous responsibility that it carried to 
protect the new Soviet government from any counter-revolutionary war or foreign 
intervention was beyond its scope. 
 
      Lenin desired an end to the Soviet Union’s inclusion in the war, and on 3 March 
1918 he was able to persuade the Communist party to sign the Peace Treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk with the Central Powers. The treaty cost the Soviet Union the Ukraine, 
Poland, the Baltic provinces and some of the Caucasus to the Central Powers, while 
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania gained their independence. Outraged, ex-
Bolshevik forces took up arms against the Soviet government and a Civil War 
ensued, which lasted from 25 October 1917 to October 1922.
9  In response to this 
conflict Lenin gave Trotsky, as the new leader of the People’s Commissariat for 
Military and Naval Affairs (Narkomvoenmor), the task of creating an authentic, 
regular army.  
 
     Lenin wanted the new army to have a hierarchy of officers, to be controlled 
centrally by the government, and to be run without the previous military 
revolutionary socialist ideology, which he found to be the cause of lack of discipline 
amongst the troops, making them a weak fighting force. Lenin also created the 
Supreme Military Council headed by ex-tsarist General Bonch-Bruevich and staffed 
by mainly former officers. In fact, due to the shortage of experienced military  
                                                           
9  Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 Pp. 1-6   
8 
leaders, thousands of former Imperial Army officers were recruited,
10 and up to 
50,000 had joined by 1921.
11 They were classed as ‘military specialists’ or 
‘voenspety’,
12 a move that proved very controversial in the Party, causing much 
bickering, but a move that Trotsky considered necessary saying, “I have had 
occasion several times already to say at public meetings that in the sphere of 
command, of operations, of military actions, we place full responsibility upon 
military specialists and consequently give them the necessary powers.”
13  
 
     The confusing assortment of civil-political structures of bureaucracy that oversaw 
the armed forces made Trotsky’s job of constructing the new army extremely 
complex, but by May 1918, he had created the position of Commander-in-Chief of 
the Red Army, which he assigned to Mikhail A. Muravev, a former Tsarist lieutenant 
colonel. Dual control was established and Political advisors, called Commissars, 
were attached to all army units in order to watch over the reliability of officers and to 
carry out political propaganda. The democratic practices that had been encouraged to 
flourish in the Red Army during the February to October 1917 revolutionary period 
had to be curbed. From the very start of Trotsky’s army it was evident that this would 
be the Party’s child, with the Party in charge of training, supply, organisation, 
recruitment, and promotion. Trotsky said in a report to the Moscow City Conference 
on 28 March 1918, “But we cannot create an Army through an administrative 
mechanism alone- which is in our case at present as bad as it could possibly be. If we  
 
                                                           
10 Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945 (New York :Metropolitan Books, 2006) P. 32 
11 “Red Army.” The New Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 9. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1994) P. 981  
12 Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, “The Russian Military and the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Case of the Oracle of Delphi or 
Cassandra?” Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth KS. 8 June. 1995. 2 Sept. 2012. 
http://www.fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/rusrma.htm  
13 Geoffrey Swain, Trotsky: Profiles in Power (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2006) P.85  
9 
do possess a powerful mechanism, this is an ideological one, namely, our Party. The 
Party will create the Army, comrades...”
14 
 
      During February 1918 volunteer enlistment had been low, with only 20,000 
joining the army. In response Trotsky started the practice of compulsory military 
training and conscription and by May the Red Army had 300,000 men. At its 
dispersal toward the end of the Civil War it was five million strong.
15 Only workers 
and peasants were allowed to join the Red Army at first, with rich peasants (kulaks), 
the bourgeoisie, the clergy, and most nobility banned.
16 Desertion was rife; mainly 
due to lack of interest in the Bolshevik Party, domestic problems of finance and war 
weariness. Trotsky realised that the army needed iron discipline, and that the officers 
seemed to lack authority and responsibility. Causing even more problems for Trotsky 
was the practice of deserters often taking their military equipment with them. 
 
      He set about instilling hard-line disciplinary actions against deserters, including 
execution of perpetrators. His Order Number 65 of November 1918, a seven-point 
document to the troops and Soviet institutions on the Southern Front, declared the 
ruthless means by which he was prepared to stop such activities. There was some 
respite however, and periodic amnesty weeks enabled thousands of soldiers to be 
taken back into the fold, with no questions asked.
17 The previous egalitarian methods 
of hierarchy were halted as he abolished the election of officers and ordered soldiers  
 
                                                           
14 Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 P.11 
15 Victor Serge and Natalia Sedova Trotsky, The Life and Death of Leon Trotsky. Trans. Arnold J. Pomerans. (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc, 1973) P.85  
16 Ibid. P.84   
17 Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 P.13 “Order Number 65.” See Appendix 
Number Two   
10 
to disband committees; but despite his orders some units still elected officers well 
into 1920.  
   
     Feeding, training, equipping, arming, housing and paying the soldiers, as well as 
the problems of discipline in the Red Army were challenges that never really went 
away. Between 1919 and 1920, because of the war torn economy and the bad supply 
situation caused by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the army could not handle the 
vicious cycle of conscripting too large a force, the lack of training, desertions, and 
stealing of equipment. Morale was extremely low; this was because the soldiers 
sometimes starved, went without uniforms and even boots, caught typhus, smallpox, 
cholera, influenza and venereal diseases. Looting and violence were by-products. 
Soldiers deserted to find food for themselves and often also for their hungry families 
and in a few cases units, mainly made up of peasants, refused to move to the front 
lines. 
 
     The Military Specialists were also problematic, many served under protest. Those 
who thought of desertion were often dissuaded by the threat of violence to their 
families, whose whereabouts was kept on file by the Commissariat of Defence. They 
were reviled by the common soldier, and even Lenin himself did not totally trust 
them. After nominating ex- Imperial army colonel Ioakim Vatsetus as Commander-
in-Chief on July 1918, he told Trotsky not to hesitate in shooting him if he failed “to 
obtain rapid and decisive success.”
18 The new officers who were turned out by the 
officer training schools at this time were more acceptable to the common soldiers and  
                                                           
18 Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 Pp.15, 16, 22   
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better trusted by the Commissariat of War as politically reliable, however their 
military attitude was questionable.  
 
      Georgi Zhukov and Semyon Budenny, joined the ranks of the Red Army on 2 
August 1918 after a call up of former Imperial Army Non-Commissioned-Officers, 
and were immediately promoted by Trotsky to the distinguished rank of platoon 
commander. Both eventually became Marshals of the Soviet Union and each would 
play their own distinctive part in the forthcoming purges of the Red Army and also 
during World War Two.
19 Despite lacking any major military credentials, many 
Bolshevik revolutionaries gained positions of great power within the Red Army, a 
fact that no doubt later accounted for many military disasters for the Soviet Union. At 
this time Joseph Stalin as a former active Bolshevik revolutionary was among those 
fortunate enough to fulfil military-political status and rose quickly in the Soviet 
Government; an occurrence that many Red Army officers would live to lament during 
the military purges of the late 1930s, early 1940s.  
 
     The Russian Civil War was not as easily distinguished as being a war between 
Reds and Whites and the half-hearted assistance of the Interventionists,
20 but was a 
much more complex and intricate matter. Not only did the Bolsheviks have to also 
contend with such Leftist enemy factions as the Socialist Revolutionaries, the rural 
Greens (mainly partisan bands) and urban anarchists, but there was continual  
                                                           
19 The rank of a Soviet Marshal was equivalent to that of a five-star General in the army of the United States of America. The 
rank was established on 22 September 1935 by the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), and abolished in 1991. 
Christopher Bellamy, “The Oxford Companion to Military History.” Oxford University Press. 2004. 25 Sept. 2012  
http://www.anwers.com/topic/marshal-field-marshal  
20 The Interventionist Forces consisted of fourteen different nations “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: The Civil War and 
the Creation of the U.S.S.R.” The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia, Volume 28 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, Inc., 1994) P.999-1000. See Appendix Number Three for the complete list.   
12 
fighting, betrayals and desertions within their own army. Trying to centralise control 
of the army for the purposes of discipline was a constant problem, a goal that Trotsky 
and Lenin never totally fulfilled. Their main opposition came from stubborn high-
ranking party members and conflicting socialist standards among Bolsheviks. 
Control over the army by the Party during the Civil War was less than solid. 
Defiance of local units to come under the umbrella of the central powers hindered 
cohesive large-scale operations. Trotsky named commanders of such units as 
‘partizanshchina,’ not to be confused with the actual partisan forces that at times 
fought with the Red Army against the Whites.
21 
 
     Nearly two-thirds of the soldiers who fought at the front lines up until late 1919 
during the Civil War had little or no training before battle, with many deserting on 
the way. Poor housing was an issue that continued for many years and caused low 
morale. Bad pay and meagre supplies of food, clothing, and equipment dispirited the 
soldiers of the Red Army on a constant basis which led to discipline problem. 
Raggedy, dirty troops were just a by-product of lack of uniforms and toiletries, but 
eventually they were better trained with organised units that were available to fight. 
Trotsky relied on a small quantity of highly trained personnel which he shifted from     
battle to battle and crisis to crisis. While his use of ex-tsarist officers was inevitable 
and had the backing of Lenin it was still an extreme sore point in the Party, 
particularly by the ‘left communists’ who feared a return to the practices of the pre-
revolutionary Imperial Army. But Trotsky would not back down in his resolve to use 
ex-tsarists and without them never would have gained the level of achievement and  
                                                           
21 Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 P.18   
13 
organisation within the Red Army that he did. Despite the fact that expertise was 
forced by bullying tactics from disinterested specialists and that the Soviet army was 
ideologically not suitable to hierarchy, they somehow survived despite the loss of 
50,000 men in the Civil War.  
 
     During the Interwar years (1922-1939), the Red Army became mainly a reservist 
army. A large territorial force (terrarmeitsy) consisted of up to 75 percent of the 
entire army of one million men. Another half a million troops were maintained in a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
14 
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 regular standing army (krasnoarmeitys), which was a much smaller force in contrast 
to the five million-strong army that had existed at the end of the Civil War. An old 
Bolshevik, and now Central Committee member, Mikhail Frunze, formulated the 
idea of “unified military doctrine.” This was a new set of ideals and principles that 
would govern the army as it prepared for any future war, and stipulated that the 
Communist Party would continue to have the leading role in military affairs as an 
army of a ‘new type.’ The people and the army would be one and the army should 
represent and defend an international proletariat.’
22 Regular career leaders, not 
elected, would lead the army under central control, and dual command, which had 
been authorized at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, was to be done away 
with in favour of a one-man command (edinonachalie).  
 
     Frunze wanted iron discipline to be instilled along with a high political 
consciousness and for the army to be in a state of constant readiness. Trotsky 
opposed Frunze’s doctrine as dangerous to free thinking, and believed that more 
attention should be given to the training of the peasants. In 1923 Lev Kamenev, 
Grigor Zinoviev and Stalin had formed an unofficial triumvirate in the Politburo 
dedicated to preventing Leon Trotsky from assuming the dying Lenin’s leadership 
and had helped dismiss Trotsky from his powerful position as War Commissar in 
1924.
23 He was not in favour with Stalin, and so Frunze’s doctrine was adopted and 
Trotsky’s fears of lack of training of soldiers by the high command would eventually  
 
 
                                                           
22 Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 P.53 
23 Chris Ward, Stalin’s Russia ( London: Edward Arnold, 1993) P.14  
16 
be proven. Frunze replaced Trotsky as the People’s Commissar of Military and Naval 
Affairs in 1924, but died unexpectedly in 1925.
24  
 
     Military Districts were established, conscription reintroduced, rearmament and 
standardisation and organisation of regiments and divisions was started. There was 
an effort to modernise the army despite the poor economy and the fact that the army 
only received approximately 2 percent of the National Budget. Stalin, who had been 
Secretary of the Communist Party (Gensec) since 1924, refused to give them any 
more money and favoured investment in civilian industry. There was also ongoing 
suspicion of the new recruits. Conscripts backgrounds were checked to weed out rich 
peasants (kulaks), former noblemen and bourgeoisie and the new soldiers were 
deloused, and tested for contagious diseases. The fact that most of the population was 
illiterate caused problems of technical training and the army favoured ‘literate 
workers.’ However, in an effort to bolster support for the Bolsheviks in the 
countryside, thousands of peasants were also enlisted. Training for new recruits 
remained basic. One conscript wrote “Our military training began with a steam bath, 
the disinfection of our clothes, a haircut that left our heads as smooth as our faces, 
and a political lecture.” A good meal and a uniform were to conclude the physical 
transformation from civilian to soldier. In an effort to increase the size of the Red 
Army, in 1936 the draft age was lowered from 21 to 19, and under the ‘Stalin 
Constitution’ all class and nationality restriction were done away with, allowing for 
kulaks and their children to join the Red Army at last. In 1939 Stalin also abolished 
draft exemption for conscientious objectors and religious believers.
25   
                                                           
24 Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 P.55-56  
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      While there was supposed to be a period of preconscription training, which 
comprised of 200 hours over a two year period, due to the short period of only two 
years conscription and lack of material, and human resources to supervise and 
conduct such training made this practice unorganised and chaotic. Basic military 
skills were supposed to be learnt during winter indoor training shortly after drafting, 
but were often neglected by indifferent officers. By the time conscripts entered the 
more advanced outdoor summer training camps many were still ignorant of the 
fundamentals. There were also many distractions that dragged the new conscripts 
away from vital training, such as political instruction, and agricultural and industrial 
work. Dneproges, the Kharkov tractor works, the Magnitogorsk metallurgy complex, 
the Gomel’ agricultural machinery company, and other industrial plants were built by 
both the Red Army’s regular and territorial units. From late 1920 to the mid 1930s 
the Red Army was more a labour army than a fighting force, and the army became 
less capable with each passing year.
26 
 
     Reservist forces were larger than regular units, but received less funding. 
Members kept their regular jobs, and were supposed to receive eight months of 
military training over a five year period, after which they went onto a list for 
‘wartime’ recall. Their training programmes were full-scale but their units lacked 
funds and equipment, and it was hard to organise unit cohesion because of the 
distances between members. Consequently, many mistakes and missed meetings 
were inevitable and went unchecked. There was a shortage of uniforms, supplies, and 
the reservists were also caught up in the usual labour force distractions. Stalin started  
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to reduce the reservist force in 1931 due to the threat of war on the horizon and by 
1939 all of these units were absorbed into the regular army.
27 
 
     During the Interwar years the Soviet General Staff created more partially-manned 
divisions instead of fully manning those already in existence, exacerbating the 
problem of the shortage of officers. The outcome of this was that it became common 
for battalions to be commanded by a senior lieutenant, rather than a major. New 
soldiers could join a unit overnight, making it impossible for commanders to know 
their men’s training levels, and disorganisation ensued. Apart from the confusion that 
too many new divisions and the dissolving of hundreds of somewhat organised 
reservist forces caused, daily life in the regular Red Army was less than idyllic. 
Housing was so bad in 1927 that the situation caused General Kliment Voroshilov to 
comment that it was “worse than under the Tsar.”
28  
 
     The soldier’s barracks were of a bad quality and a poor budget prevented any 
maintenance, while conscription rates exceeded the building rate. Soldiers had to 
construct their homes themselves. Zhukov wrote, that in 1932 the entire cavalry 
corps in which he served relocated, and the troops had to spend eighteen months 
building their own quarters from the ground up, “degenerating, as a result, into an 
inefficient labour force. This disastrously affected morale and combat worthiness. 
Discipline grew lax...”
29 Training was suspended while troops spent their entire time 
constructing buildings, while in the meantime they often froze in tents during winter 
months. There were no bath houses, and the high standards of hygiene that Frunze’s  
                                                           
27 Ibid, P.60 
28 Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991  P.65 
29 Ibid, P.65   
19 
reforms had tried to instil went by the wayside. When famine struck the Soviet Union 
in 1933, rations were cut by 30 percent, except in the honoured Moscow Military 
District, but at least they were better than the meagre scratching that the civilians 
were reduced to. 
 
     In some areas the malnourished draftees of 1933 were immediately put on extra 
rations, whereas in other districts officers were indifferent to the suffering of their 
men. However, such callousness did not go unrewarded, and troops could protest 
until investigations put the perpetrators under arrest. Unit farms were encouraged, 
but even then, greedy and unscrupulous supply officers tried to use the profits for 
their own gain. These farms became part of the institution until they were done away 
with in 1991. Soldiers often knew more about farming than warfare, and the assistant 
commander of 87th Rifle Regiment knew all the thirty-eighty cows owned by the 
regiment by name.
30  
 
     Supply in the Red Army was unorganised, and when standard uniforms did 
eventually arrive in full there was still a shortage of warm winter woollens. Pay was 
low, with as little as one ruble, fourty kopeks a month.
31 In 1933 a Bureau of Red 
Army Men’s Letters was established to address their grievances. Due to the physical 
underdevelopment of the national infrastructure most of the Bureau’s secretaries did 
not even knowing the correct statutes and codes that governed actioning these 
requests, so most letters went unanswered or were sent on to other agencies. 
                                                           
30 Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 P.67 
31 Today’s current exchange rates: 10 Russian Rubles (RUB) are worth 32c American (U.S.D). Stephen Ostermiller, “Russian 
Ruble (RUB) and United States Dollar (USD) Currency Exchange Rate Conversion Calculator: 28 September 2012.”  2003-
2012, 28 Sept. 2012 IGMARKET.COM.AU.  http://www.coinmill.com/RUB_USDhtml   
 20 
Consequently, this factor along with the bad housing situation, low pay, food  
shortages, inadequate training, and lack of attention to the soldier’s welfare by 
apathetic officers caused discipline within the Red Army to become even worse.   
 
     Red Star (Krasnaia zvezda), the official Red Army newspaper issued a report on 
August 1932 that stated,   
Sometimes the cause [of indiscipline] (sic) lies in the poor organisation of the daily 
routine. Tents are dirty, boots are uncleaned owing to the lack of brushes and 
blacking, cloths are torn owing to the lack of needles, thread and repairing material. 
There is an inadequate quantity of crockery in the mess halls and the supervision 
over the preparation of food is insufficient.
 32  
 
The most common crimes that soldiers were court-martialled for were theft of money 
and selling supplies to civilians. On the eve of the purges, between 1 January and 31 
May 1937, the army recorded 400,000 disciplinary infringements.
33 This is clear 
evidence that the soldiers of the Red Army were not receiving adequate pay, food, or 
discipline at this stage in the army’s development.  
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 Chapter 2 
 
The Red Army Purged   
 
 
During the late 1920s, Joseph Stalin, having turned his position of Secretary of the 
Communist Party, which he gained in 1922, into one of ultimate power, unleashed a 
great purge upon the peasants, both rich and poor, and then upon members of the 
Politburo (Political Bureau), whom he thought may be a threat to his reign. 
Thousands of Kulaks were opposed to Stalin abolishing the New Economic Policy 
(N. E. P.),
34 that Lenin had created in 1921, in favour of a new system, the collective 
farm movement or kolkhoz.
35They were executed, deported or kicked off of their 
own farms. The N.E.P. had allowed the peasants to keep and sell their surplus grain, 
which encouraged them to grow more. Eventually, the agricultural industry became 
larger and more successful than that of the industrial, causing factory goods to 
become expensive. Peasants, having to pay higher prices for these goods, started to 
hoard their surplus grain, waiting for higher prices. Unable to procure enough grain 
for the industrialised areas, the Soviet party had to install a policy of rationing. 
Consequently, Stalin embarked on a system that required voluntary pooling of land, 
agricultural implements, and buildings from the peasant farmers. This system was 
eventually enforced, due to strong opposition from the peasants. 25,000,000 poor 
peasants (bedneyaki and serednyaki), were taken from their farms and villages and  
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forced to work on these kolkhoz, being rounded up by ‘collectivisation brigades.’ 
Stalin’s second wife Nadya, after criticising his Collectivisation policy committed 
suicide; such was the universal fear of the tyrant.
36  
 
      After the 1934 murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov, who was head of the 
Leningrad party organisation, and one of Stalin’s best friends and most trusted aides, 
Stalin launch a purge of the Politburo. Using Kirov’s murder as an excuse to accuse 
and arrest his enemies and those who had insulted him in the past, he was able to 
destroy them, and settle some old scores. Old grudges featured in the background of 
many of Stalin’s arrests and executions. The fact that Kirov had been more popular 
than Stalin in a voting session of the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1934 for the Central 
Committee, was closer to the truth of why Kirov had suddenly been murdered, 
despite being one of Stalin’s closest friends. Friendship and loyalty meant nothing to 
him in his desire to stay in his position of absolute power. Once again, using the 
murder of Kirov as an excuse, Stalin turned his wrath on the Red Army and some of 
its powerful leaders, who had the capability and strength to bring him down. 
Thousands of officers were accused of being spies or ‘enemies of the state,’ and were 
arrested, given long prison sentences, or executed. Denunciations of other so-called 
spies by tortured victims kept the Gulags full, and the NKVD executioners busy.  
 
     On June 1937, a shock announcement was made that several high ranking officers 
of the Red Army, including Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the Deputy People’s 
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Commissar of Defence and one of the first five Marshals of the Soviet Union, had 
been executed for treason, for plotting a military coup.
37 He was one of the greatest 
military thinkers in the Soviet Union at the time, and he and other military strategists 
had developed a theory of ‘Deep Battle’ tactics; which was tailored to the 
economical, cultural, and geopolitical position of the Soviet Union. They had 
endeavoured to create a military strategy with its own specialised operational art and 
tactics. The Soviet Union was the first country to officially distinguish the third level 
of military thinking which occupied the position between strategy and tactics. By 
1936 it had become part of the Red Army Field Regulations. ‘Deep Battle’ envisaged 
the breaking of the enemy’s forward defences, or tactical zones, for fresh 
uncommitted mobile operational reserves to exploit, by breaking into the strategic 
depth of an enemy front. The goal of a deep operation was to inflict a decisive 
strategic defeat on the enemy and render the defence of their front more difficult, 
impossible - or, indeed, irrelevant. Unlike most other doctrines, deep battle stressed 
combined arms cooperation at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.  
 
      Not only were the military strategists liquidated, but their ideas were also 
dispensed with. Soviet sources admitted in 1988, 
In 1937-1938...all commanders of the armed forces, members of the military 
councils, and chiefs of the political departments of the military districts, the majority  
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of the chiefs of the central administrations of the People’s Commissariat of Defence, 
all Corps commanders, almost all division and brigade commanders, about one-third 
of the regimental commissars, many teachers of higher, middle military and military- 
political schools were judged and destroyed.
38  
 
     The deep operation concept was thrown out of Soviet military strategy as it was 
associated with the denounced figures that created it. This in turn was a major cause 
of the disastrous military blunders during the Winter War with Finland in 1939, and 
also in the opening chapter of the German invasion of 1941. The Soviet deep battle, 
in the words of one historian, “was radically different to the nebulous ‘blitzkrieg’ 
method, although it produced similar if more strategically impressive results.
39  
 
      Prior to the military High Command executions, Stalin’s henchmen, the NKVD, 
had been systematically arresting and interrogating (torturing), other officers from 
Military Districts all over the Soviet Union in order to gain denunciations, that in 
turn implied other officers, and so on. By the time Stalin’s scathing purge of the 
military had done its damage three of the first five Marshals of the Soviet Union had 
been executed, (only Stalin’s two old cronies, Klementi Voroshilov and Semion 
Budenny, whom he had instilled himself, had survived), along with 13 of the 15 
Army Commanders; 8 of the 9 Fleet Admirals; 50 of the 57 Corps Commanders; all  
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of the 16 Army Commissars; 25 of the 28 Corp Commissars, and 58 of the 64 
Divisional Commissars.
40 The damage to the Red Army by these military purges was 
phenomenal, and has been regarded as the major cause of such high losses of  
personnel during their invasion of Finland in 1939, which became known as the 
Winter War and its appalling state of readiness just prior to the German invasion in 
1941.  
 
     The military purges created a chronic shortage of officers to lead the troops, and it 
is estimated that there was a need for at least 220,000 more to command the new 
army before Hitler’s forces attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, in a covert military 
assault entitled Operation Barbarossa.
41 Red Army troops were left untrained, and the 
new commanders who replaced them were too young and inexperienced. The 
German General Staff, who were the elite trainers of the Wehrmacht, commented at 
the end of 1939 that, “although they found the principle of leadership good in the 
Soviet Army, the leadership itself is, however, too young and inexperienced.”
42 
Many once capable and strong military leaders who survived the purges and were 
eventually released, due to having been imprisoned for some time, were left 
spiritually, physically, and mentally broken, being of no further use to the army. 
Stalin’s hand-picked Marshals, Voroshilov and Budenny were said to have been 
catastrophic leaders, but were arbitrarily allowed to live.
43  
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     On 23 August 1939 the Soviet Union made a pact with Nazi Germany which 
became known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-aggression Pact. The pact had a 
secret clause dividing Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland into 
German and Soviet spheres of influence.
44 Stalin needed to buy time to prepare for  
the war with Germany that he knew was eventually coming, and thought that the Red 
Army would be armed and prepared by 1942. On 1 September 1939 Germany 
invaded Poland from the north, south and west, and sixteen days later the Soviet 
Union’s General Staff had, on short notice, mobilised the Belorussian and the Kiev 
Special Military districts to invade from the east. The invasion, apart from some 
difficulties with co-ordination and cooperation between units due to the short notice, 
was a success and the Red Army had secured eastern Poland by the end of the month.  
 
     The Battle of Khalkin-Gol, from May to September 1939 in Mongolia against the 
Japanese, was not so easily won. With supply depots far from the battlefield it took 
three months and a massive effort by supply and transport personnel to overcome this 
problem. Morale was atrocious, with newly arrived reservist being more of a 
detriment than a benefit and sometimes whole battalions ran from the battlefield 
abandoning their weapons and equipment. The confusion and bad manoeuvring of 
forces was eventually overcome by General Georgi Zhukov’s, clever use of 
armoured forces and a firm stance on discipline. He was one of the few to escape the 
military purges of the late 1930s. He had no qualms in using up as many troops as 
were needed to ensure victory and casualties at Khalkin-Gol were an astronomical 34 
percent.
45   
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     In the Soviet Union’s invasion of Finland (November 1939-March 1940), the Red 
Army was totally humiliated, exhibiting a lack of organisation, strategic military 
tactics, and the need for more experienced officers than could be provided. Fighting  
in temperatures as low as minus 40 degrees C, thousands of untrained and ill-
equipped soldiers were sent out by equally unskilled officers, terrified by the purges 
that were still occurring. Such was the lack of army materiel, that many Red Army 
soldiers were sent, usually to their deaths, to walk across snowy mine fields without 
the use of mine detectors. Due to the lack of the correct winter outfits many froze to 
death where they lay after being wounded. The Soviet troops were totally unprepared 
to outmanoeuvre the Finish soldiers, who took advantage of the fact that they knew 
their own landscape well, and were perfectly camouflaged in white uniforms. This, 
plus the fact that they had adopted a form of snow-guerrilla fighting earned them the 
Russian nick-name of ‘belydsmert’ or ‘white death’ from the Red Army soldiers.
46 
American journalist Virginia Cowles wrote when visiting the battlefield,  
 
The roads and forests were strewn with the bodies of the men and horses; with 
wrecked tanks, field kitchens, trucks, gun carriages, maps, books, and articles of 
clothing. The corpses were frozen as hard as petrified wood ... Some of the bodies 
were piled on top of each other... covered only by a merciful blanket of snow; others 
were sprawled against the trees in grotesque attitudes.
47  
 
     Red Army casualties in this short war were approximately 126,875 dead and 
missing with 265,000 wounded. This resulted in a major re-evaluation within the Red  
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Army,  which included the replacement of Marshal Kliment Voroshilov by Marshal 
Semion Timoshenko as Commissar of Defence. Voroshilov’s last report before 
leaving his post was scathing in its condemnation of the condition of the Red Army, 
and one line stated that, “The quality of officer training is poor, especially in the 
platoons and companies...”
48   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
48 Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of  the Soviet Army, 1917-199 P.99  
29 
     Chapter 3 
 
Assault on the Soviet Union 
 
 
At 3:15 am on 22 June 1941, Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union 
was launched. The length of the front was 1,800 kilometres, the longest ever in 
history.
49 Hitler was keen for new ‘living space’ (Lebensraum), and the vast regions 
of the Soviet Union had always been on his agenda. He wrote in Mein Kampf  in 
1924,  “...However when we speak of new land in Europe today, we must principally 
bear in mind Russia and the border states subject to her. Destiny itself seems to wish 
to point the way for us here.” The Soviet Union was a particular focus for his anti- 
Semitic, anti- Communist, and anti- Slav prejudices. In a speech in Nuremburg in 
1937 Hitler had referred to the leaders of the Soviet Union as, “an uncivilised 
Jewish- Bolshevik international guild of criminals.”
50 Germany, flushed with the 
success of its easy victories over the armies of Western Europe in 1939, believed that 
its forces would have what they thought were racially inferior beings in the Soviet 
Union, subdued in a matter of months. That almost became a reality as the problems 
that the Red Army had experienced during the interwar years of lack of training, 
equipment, discipline, morale, and multiple desertions only magnified after the 
invasion.  
 
     In a three-pronged attack by the Germans, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb 
commanded Army Group North heading for the Baltic States and Leningrad, Field 
Marshal Fedor von Bock was with Army Group Centre advancing towards Minsk,  
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Smolensk and Moscow, while Field-Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt led Army Group 
South towards the Ukraine. The Wehrmacht’s use of Blitzkrieg
51 tactics enabled 
them to advanced almost one hundred kilometres inland on their first day. While they 
were highly organised and their spirits soared, due to the surprise and advantage of 
the German attack, on the Soviet side shock and chaos reigned.   
 
     Bridges were seized; Stukas flew off to find tank fields, headquarters and 
communication centres. Within a few hours 1,200 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, 
many never having attained flight. Most of the Soviet pilots had little or no 
knowledge of aerial combat, and their planes were old models or in need of repair. 
Despite this, the Soviet Union Information Bureau (propaganda machine), reported 
on 24 June that 76 enemy planes had been destroyed in the last twenty four hours.
52 
German Panzer divisions advanced as soon as they heard word that the infantry had 
taken bridges. At 5:45 a.m., from his headquarters in Wilkowski, Poland, Hitler 
proclaimed to the German people and the army through the voice of Goebbels his 
propaganda minister, on the radio, the lie that Germany was threatened by 
“approximately 160 Russian divisions massed on our frontier.”
53 He continued that, 
“For weeks violations of that frontier had been taking place...This has brought us to 
the hour when it is necessary for us to take steps against this plot devised by Jewish  
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                  Map Two: The three- pronged German invasion of the Soviet Union 
German armed forces achieved strategic surprise and made substantial progress towards their initial 
objectives. Army Group Center reached Smolensk by July. Large Soviet military forces were 
surrounded as a result. An operational pause ensued at the center of the front while armoured forces 
from Army Group Center struck south to link up with forces striking northward from Army Group 
South. This move destroyed a substantial concentration of Soviet armed forces around Kiev.
54       
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Anglo-Saxon war mongers, and the equally Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik centre in 
Moscow...”
55  
 
     The Soviet forces were slightly larger than that of the invaders, (approximately 3 
million each), but due to the thousands of officers executed during the military 
purges of the 1930s, they were no match for the more experienced and skilled 
soldiers of the German armies. Post-purge promotions had placed many unsuitable 
men in High Command, but Commander Shaposhnikov, an ex-Tsarist colonel, now 
Chief of Staff, was still in favour and was able to promote quite a few efficient 
officers. Marshal Semion Timoshenko who had taken over from Marshal Voroshilov 
had tried to restore the Red Army after the disaster in Finland and was now Defence 
Commissar.   
 
     Stalin, in denial for the first couple of days after the invasion, initially thought that 
there must have been a military coup of Hitler’s Generals. He had trusted Hitler and 
seems to have gone into a state of shock at the betrayal. “...he wasn’t interested in 
anything, he’d lost all initiative and was in a bad way,”
 56 reported Old Bolshevik 
Anastas Mikoyan, whose main assignment throughout the war was supplying the Red 
Army with materials, food, and other necessities, gaining him the nickname, ‘the ice 
cream and frankfurt man.’
57 Communications had been disrupted and nobody knew 
what was going on. On the first day of the invasion the towns of Kiev, Sebastopol,  
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Odessa, Minsk and Riga had been bombed.
58 Georgy Semenyak, a young soldier in 
the Soviet 204th Division recalled, “I fought on the border for three days and three 
nights...the bombing, shooting...explosions of artillery gunfire continued non- 
stop...aeroplanes continuously dropped bombs.” On the fourth day his unit retreated 
into chaos and he watched in despair as the officers deserted. “The lieutenants, 
captains ... took rides on passing vehicles...mostly trucks travelling east.” 
59 As a 
result of the purges, and the expansion of the Red Army most of these petrified 
young officers had only been in their positions for less than a year, and were clearly 
unable to cope.  
 
     The collapse of the Soviet Union was expected in a very short time by the 
German officials and almost all of the world powers. The U.S Secretary of the Navy 
wrote to President Roosevelt that, “the best opinion that I can get is that it will take 
anywhere from six weeks to two months for Hitler to clean up on Russia.” 
Meanwhile, the British Home Office told the BBC that they should not give out the 
impression that Russian armed resistance would last more than six weeks.
60 
  
     At a meeting in Moscow on 27 June attended by Stalin and members of the 
Politburo, Marshal Georgy Zhukov was questioned about the situation, but visibly 
shaken could tell them nothing. The military did not know where the Germans were, 
how far they’d advanced, or where their own armies were. Stalin stormed out of the   
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 building saying, “Lenin founded our state and now we’ve fucked it up.” He hid in 
his dacha, depressed for the next few days, while the Germans advanced on Minsk. 
Eventually, senior members of the Politburo persuaded him to ‘lead the Soviet Union 
to victory’ and in a display of intimacy and kind words to the Soviet people, Stalin 
made a radio announcement on 3 July. “Comrades, citizens, brothers and sisters, men  
of our Army and Navy, he began, my words are addressed to you, dear friends.” He 
gave a brief overview of the ‘perfidious military attack’ by the Germans, revealed the 
fact that the Red Air Force lay in ruins, despite their heroic defence, and explained 
how Hitler’s troops had already invaded and captured Lithuania, most of Latvia, the 
western part of Belorussia, and part of Western Ukraine. He could hardly disguise his 
defensiveness as he spoke of the Soviet-German Pact which had bought them a year 
and a half of peace, and promised military success in the near future. “...this short-
lived military gain for Germany is only an episode.”
61 Stalin’s kind words to the 
people was said to have endeared them to him immensely, and despite his eradication 
of millions of his own people during the purges and the start of the Collectivisation 
programme, and the organised mass-population migrations after the war of the 
Kalmyks, Karahai, Chechens, Balkars, and Tartars, he was mourned sadly after his 
death in 1953 as the saviour of the Motherland.
62  
 
     Between June 1941 and February 1945, at least 5.7 million Red Army personnel 
were taken prisoner during the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Out of this 
number an astonishing 3.3 million died, usually of disease or starvation. Typhus was  
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rife due to the soldiers being covered in lice. Most were given no food for days, and  
then thrown a few boxes of scraps by the Germans, who watched as they fought and 
scrambled for the contents. They had no shelter, being jailed in open wire camps 
with barely any water, and some eventually succumbed to cannibalism, eating livers, 
lungs, and buttocks. German soldiers also arbitrarily shot at them. Georgy Semenyak, 
a soldier captured near Minsk in July 1941 said, “They just never considered us  
human.” 
63 Consequently morale in the Red Army was practically non-existent 
during the early months of the German assault on the Soviet Union.  
 
     A war of unparalleled brutality had been started, echoing the very nature of each 
opposing force’s leader. The Einsatzgruppen, Germany’s special ‘task force’ in 
charge of liquidating Jews and Soviet Commissars, set to work in the first couple of 
days of the invasion, even taking Jewish children out of orphanages to be shot. After 
Kharkov had been taken the Germans did not allow the citizens beyond the city 
limits, even to trade for food. Townsfolk ate all the dogs, and when they had gone 
they had to eat the bark and leaves from birch trees. The Germans had no sympathy 
for starving children, whom they labelled ‘unnutzer Esser,’ (useless eaters).
 Hitler 
ordered that during retreats “every place of inhabitation must be burnt down and 
destroyed...” These atrocities were also carried out by ordinary German soldiers, 
despite their claims after the war that it was only SS and Einsatzgruppen who 
committed these despicable acts.
64 Eye-witnesses, both Soviet and German testify to 
this lie. Walter Mauth, a German infantryman, when talking of the scorched earth  
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policy said, “I never noticed anybody bothering to have a look inside the house to see  
whether there was a sick woman or anybody else in there.” Soviet units also adhered 
to the scorched earth policy, but their reason was to deprive the Germans of food and 
supplies. Either way civilians suffered from the military policies of both sides.
 65  
 
      A German document dated 23 May 1941, entitled ‘Political- Economic 
Guidelines for the Economic Organization East,’ stated that the German’s objective  
was to use Russian resources for feeding the Wermacht and also for supplying 
German -occupied Europe. Because of this policy, 30 million Soviets were expected 
to die of starvation, and they had never intended to feed their Red Army captives in 
the first place. The plan for German soldiers to ‘live off the land’ was easier said than 
done as they ran out of supplies and their transportation from the rear was hampered 
by inadequate Soviet roads which were not metallised. 
 
     On 21 August, after much debate with his generals, Hitler decided to encircle 
Leningrad in the North instead of heading for Moscow, and to also attack Soviet 
forces in the South at Kiev. This decision turned out in the German’s favour as large 
Soviet forces were still amassed south of the Pripet Marshes and the Germans may 
have been trapped inside the city of Moscow had they tried to take it at that stage. 
Instead, Hitler sent Heinz Guderian’s Panzer Group south to Kiev in the Ukraine, 
which was a victory for the Germans. Having been ordered to hold Kiev by Stalin, 
600,000 Soviet Red Army troops were captured in the most amazing encirclement 
battle in modern history. Many were trapped on the banks of the River Dnieper, as  
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Kiev fell on 18 September. “Hold out as long as you can,” Stalin had ordered. 
General Zhukov, who had not agreed to the decision to hold the city walked out on 
his position as Chief of the General Staff. “We did wage encirclement battles across 
distances which we’d been simply incapable of imaging before,” said Hubert Menzel 
a German tank officer at Kiev. Hitler was elated, and believed that the German 
Wermacht should now push toward Moscow in an Operation entitled Typhoon. 
Despite the German victory at Kiev, it did in fact delay the assault on Moscow which 
inevitably turned out in the Soviets’ favour, due to the bad weather approaching.  
 
     The town of Vyazma was the last major obstacle in the German’s way to 
Moscow, and the Red Army soldiers who took part in the battle for this city were 
badly trained and poorly equipped. Sometimes the soldiers only possessed one rifle 
between five, and the 60-millimetre guns that they were expected to use that were  
left over from World War One, had no modern sighting devices. At the beginning of 
October the German 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups linked to trap five Soviet armies 
during the battle. “We were face to face with the Germans,’ said Viktor Strazdovski, 
an eighteen year old Red Army soldier, “We didn’t feel confident...we felt doomed. 
There were four of us, with two rifles between us. The woods around us were 
ablaze.” The material needs of the Red Army had never been adequately met since its 
inception in 1918, and Soviet factories could not keep up with the enormous losses of 
weapons and equipment at the front during this devastating confrontation with the 
Germans. This caused bad morale in the ranks. Production could only replace 30  
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percent of rifles, 27 percent of tanks, 58 percent of guns and mortar, and 55 percent 
of war-planes lost in the first half of 1941.
66  
 
     Walter Schaefer-Kehnert, a German officer in the 11th Panzer Division, described 
the aftermath of the battle of Vyazma as something he would never forget, “...as that 
of a battlefield of old with thousands and thousands of dead and dying Russian 
soldiers lying in a field..”
 One German Panzer trooper described the amazing efforts 
of a group of Soviet Red Army soldiers rushing at them. Only the soldiers in the 
front row had rifles, and as these men were shot down, the row behind picked up 
their rifles and carried on. 
67 Nevertheless, the Soviets showed no sign of total  
collapse, as Hitler had expected. Even though the condition of the Red Army was 
poor, with a lack of coordination, weapons, and skilled leadership, they did have a 
large number of reserves that they could call upon. During the early months of the 
German assault these young men who were not well trained and who frequently 
turned up drunk on vodka,
68 were often put on the front-line and died in their first 
battle.  
 
     The Germans took 660,000 Red Army prisoners after the Battle of Vyazma and 
from the town of Bryansk nearby. Now the last obstacle on the road to Moscow had 
been eliminated. In October, Army Group North, with the help of Finnish troops had 
cut off the city of Leningrad and was trying to starve the inhabitants out. This siege 
would last 900 days, and over half a million citizens would die of starvation or 
dystrophy before the siege was lifted. After the destruction of Kiev, Army Group  
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South was ready to pillage the Soviet Union’s ‘breadbasket’ for the Third Reich. 
Only 90,000 Red Army troops defended Moscow and some Soviet cavalry units 
stealthily managed to sneak behind enemy lines and lay down mines in the forests 
that lay on the road to the city.
69  
 
      By Mid-October the Germans were roughly one hundred kilometres away from 
the city of Moscow. They had taken more enemy prisoners than any invading force 
in history, but by now should have won the war. Then something happened that was 
to start a series of events which would help to turn the tide of the war in favour of the 
Red Army. The Rasputitsa, the bi-annual season of rain and mud began, and the 
Blitzkrieg ground to a halt as Panzers, trucks, equipment, horses, and men were 
trapped in the thick mud caused by the winter rains. Richard Overy argues in his 
book, Russia’s War, that despite the quagmire caused by the autumn rains, the 
German’s progress was already slowing down due to the fanatical resistance of 
Soviet forces, and the transportation difficulties that they were experiencing over  
such vast areas of occupied territory.
70 Stalin knew that the frosts would follow 
allowing the Germans to continue on their march towards the capital and that he had 
to get the Red Army organised in a hurry.  
 
     Stalin ordered General Zhukov to call up Siberian rifle regiments and they were 
on their way across the Urals to help save Moscow. These units were made of strong, 
fit men used to harsh winter climates, who were equipped with warm padded 
clothing. They were expert skiers, flying along in white camouflage suits similar to 
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     Operation Typhoon: 30 September – 5 December 1941 
German armed forces regrouped in September, after the destruction of Soviet military forces around 
Kiev, with the intention of launching a final offensive against Moscow (Operation Typhoon) before 
winter. The attack began with promise but the autumn rains made it impossible to continue the 
operation until the winter frost arrived. By this time, German military units were exhausted and the 
Soviet defenders were demonstrating increasing resistance.
71  
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those worn by the Finnish ‘snow-ghosts’ in the Winter War. Red Army cavalry 
riding sturdy Cossack ponies also fought at the battle at Moscow. Due to the rains, 
the Germans forces had to wait a further three weeks before they were able to resume 
the attack on Moscow. Nevertheless their hopes were high, and they believed that 
Soviet resistance was virtually at an end. 
 
     Meanwhile, Moscow had come to a standstill, as people contemplated fleeing the 
capital. There were lootings and food riots, and people stormed the train stations in 
order to get out. Stalin contacted Zhukov in Leningrad, who was by now reinstated 
as Chief of the General Staff, and spoke to him at length over the phone asking what  
was needed for the defence of Moscow. Zhukov answered that he wanted tanks, 
artillery, and rockets, saying that, “if I get even part of the help that I asked for, we 
will hold Moscow.”
72 Stalin’s Minister of Internal Affairs, Lavrentiy Beria, who had 
brutally instigated the infamous Katyn Forrest massacre of 22,000 Polish POWs in 
1940, and had organised Trotsky to be murdered in Mexico in 1940, under Stalin’s 
orders, was in favour of leaving the city.
 73 According to Stalin’s bodyguard, Beria, 
Georgi Malenkov, and Lazar Kaganovich, “lost their self control,” with Beria, in a 
show of cowardliness declaring, “We shall be shot down like partridges.”
74 On 15 
October foreign embassies were told to prepare to leave for Kuybyshev on the Volga 
and NKVD interrogators also left, taking their most important prisoners with them. 
These men, who were senior officers in the Red Army, were badly needed to fight in 
the battle. They had been arrested due to the continuing purges, and faced execution. 
On a positive note, Stalin heard that Red Army divisions from Manchuria were  
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already starting to deploy to the area around Moscow, and that two of the Siberian 
rifle regiments had arrived.  
 
     Stalin considered leaving the capital, and in a crisis meeting with Beria, Molotov, 
Malenkov, and Aleksandre Shcherbakov, the new chief of the Red Army’s political 
division, he made plans to blow up factories, bridges, railways, roads, and even the 
Moscow Metro before the city was taken by the enemy. On 18 October, the Central 
Committee members and their families left the city. Stalin hesitated in leaving 
Moscow, working and dossing down on a mattress in the Metro under Kirov Street, 
in a specially constructed compartment. He asked everyone, “What shall we do,” and  
was encouraged by his mistress Valenchka and the positiveness of his daughter 
Svetlana not to abandon Moscow. Stalin called Zhukov again for his reassurance that 
Moscow could be held. Later that evening at his dacha in Semyonovskoe he made his 
decision to stay, saying “We’ll stay here until victory.
75  
 
     The strong, positive, psychological effect that his decision had on the people and 
the soldiers of the Red Army cannot be overestimated. Stalin was the Soviet Union, 
and if he had run from Moscow, why shouldn’t everyone have run, including the Red 
Army. A Harsh ‘state of siege’ was instituted from 20 October after Stalin’s decision 
to stay and defend Moscow, with Beria’s NKVD entrusted to keep the order. Beria, 
who was later proven to be a serial rapist and murderer of young Soviet women, had 
no reservations about the cruel and vicious methods used by his secret police to 
introduce the curfew Stalin ordered from midnight to 5am.
76 Citizens caught looting  
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were shot dead, cars full of fleeing Muscovites were overturned, and panic was 
quelled in the most inhuman fashion. “It isn’t peacetime...you shoot them on the 
spot...”said Vladimir Ogryzko, commander of one of the NKVD units. “These severe 
measures, these beautiful measures, are the essence and content of war.”
77 
 
     The brewery horses that the Germans had brought with them to pull the heavy 
artillery guns nearly all died of heart failure, having had the enormous task of hauling 
heavy equipment through quicksand, mud, and snow since the beginning of the 
campaign. Others were killed to feed the quickly increasing number of starving 
troops. The German troops were surprised by the Soviet counter-attack of one  
million Red Army troops plus the Siberian units. Stalin had been able to utilise a 
large part of the 700,000 troops from his Far Eastern Army, who were usually used 
to guard against Japan. Soviet spy Richard Sorge had reported in September that 
Japan would not attack Russia. After first discussing this situation with his Far 
Eastern satraps, he ordered Kaganovich to organise non-stop trains to rush 400,000 
fresh troops, 1,000 tanks and 1,000 planes across the Eurasian wastes and locate 
them behind Moscow.
78  
 
     By 30 October, the Germans were less than eighty kilometres from Moscow, but 
nevertheless, against the advice of General Artemev, Stalin decided to continue with 
the annual Red Army parade in Red Square that was due on 7 November. At the 
beginning of the parade during a snow storm, which hampered the vision of the 
Luftwaffe, during freezing temperatures and biting cold winds, Stalin spoke for half  
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an hour in inspiring tones, declaring, “If they want a war of extermination, they shall 
have one.” The dashing, heavily moustached Marshal Semion Budonny, the citizen’s 
favourite, rode up and down Red Square on his white stallion, sabre drawn, in a show 
of bravado for his fans. T-34 tanks, the best general purpose tank built in World War 
Two, and Red Army troops paraded in columns up Gorky Street and marched 
straight out to the front in a positive morale-building show that inspired both the 
citizens of Moscow and the Red Army itself.
79  
 
     The Germans resumed their advance on Moscow on 15 November during the 
winter freeze, making good progress, and by 4 December some units were only  
twenty kilometres from the capital. From this distance one Panzer unit tried to hit the 
Kremlin with a 10.5 centimetre gun without success. Their initial strategy was to try 
to break the morale of the Soviet people and the defending forces of the Red Army. 
Walter Schaefer-Kehnert, from the German Panzer unit that tried to shell the Kremlin 
remarked, “We thought only of the morale consequences on the citizens of Moscow- 
shooting to the town and the Kremlin!”
80  
 
     As the weather turned freezing cold and dropped to minus 30 degrees C, the 
German’s machine guns, which were precision instruments, became useless as the oil 
thickened. The Germans, having not prepared for such a long invasion and thinking 
that they would have won the war by now, lacked the appropriate winter clothing and 
froze in their summer coats. Their steel-capped jackboots hasted the onset of frostbite 
and there were up to 100,000 cases by Christmas 1941. On the other hand, the Red  
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Army soldiers were given the advantage of warm padded camouflage suits, 
‘ushanki’- round fur caps with ear flaps, and ‘valenki’- felt boots for winter warfare 
in a policy that had been adopted after the catastrophe in Finland where many 
wounded soldiers had frozen to death.
 81  
 
       The German soldiers were miserable, cold men, wrapped in scarves stolen from 
old Soviet women. Their toes and fingers froze during the night, and guards sitting in 
holes dug into the snow had to be checked every two hours in case they had frozen to 
death. These were a very different army of men from those that started out confident, 
strong, and full of bravado in June. Battle stress and the horrors of the war had  
caused many German troops to suicide, and most shot themselves while alone on 
sentry duty.
82 Zhukov and the forces of the Red Army drove them back over 300 
kilometres by 5 December, but lost 155,000 men in twenty days in the effort. The 
Blitzkrieg on Moscow had failed, and this was Stalin’s and the Red Army’s first 
victory against the German invasion since the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. 
The Axis offensive on Moscow came to an end.   
 
     On the retreat from Moscow, the hungry German soldiers stole livestock, 
vegetables, and even took the sugar used to feed the peasants bees. They used their 
furniture and houses for firewood. On 5 December Hitler signed his directive 
Number 39, ordering the Wermacht to assume a defensive stance on the whole front. 
However, German troops were unable to organize a solid defence at their present 
locations and were forced to pull back to merge their lines. As General Heinz  
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Guderian, Commander of Panzer Group 2 wrote in his journal, “the offensive on 
Moscow failed...We underestimated the enemy’s strength, as well as his size and 
climate. Fortunately, I stopped my troops on 5 December; otherwise a catastrophe 
would be unavoidable.”
83 On 6 December the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbour, and 
on the following day, Hitler declared war on the United States of America. This 
declaration proved fortuitous to the Soviet Union, and in May 1942 Vyacheslav 
Molotov would meet with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States 
gaining a Lend-Lease treaty, and an alliance with Britain after meeting Winston 
Churchill in London.   
                                                                                                                                                  
 
     As a result of the German’s defeat at Moscow, in an effort to restore the fighting 
capacity of its forces, Hitler had to move large numbers of troops out of France and 
other occupied countries to the Soviet-German front. Zhukov, in his book Greatest 
Military Battles wrote that, “Everyone from private to general displayed great 
heroism in fulfilling his sacred duty to the homeland, sparing neither his strength nor 
his very life in the defence of the city...Under hectic, almost catastrophically 
complicated and difficult conditions our troops were tempered, matured, 
accumulated experience and, once the absolutely essential minimum of arms were in 
their hands, moved from retreat and defensive manoeuvre to a powerful offensive.”
84 
 
     While Zhukov’s is a patriotic Soviet view of the Battle for Moscow, the harsh 
reality was that desertion within the Red Army was rife during the battle; tens of  
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thousands of the four million Soviet men and women who joined the ‘opolchentsy’ 
(untrained volunteers) were slaughtered at the front; ‘special troops’ were stationed 
behind the Red Army lines with machine guns ready to shoot dead any retreating 
soldiers; and that it was mainly ‘fear’ (of their officers and the Commissars) and 
‘hate’ (for Nazism) that won the battle. By February 1942, 2,663,000 Red Army men 
and women had been killed in action.
85 To commemorate the battle, Moscow was 
awarded the title of ‘Hero City’ in 1965, on the 20th Anniversary of Victory Day.
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Chapter 4 
 
The Soviet Counter- Offensives 
 
 
 
After the German offensive towards Moscow failed the Soviets launch a Counter-
Offensive on the Kalinin Front and recaptured Krasnaya Polyana and several other 
cities in the immediate vicinity of Moscow. They did not however achieve their 
strategic objectives and were relatively depleted by that time. The Red Army 
launched more counter-offensives which lasted up until the end of April and included 
the collective Offensive Operations of Oboyan-Kursk, Lyuban, Demyansk, Orel-
Bolkhov, and the Rzhev-Vyazma Strategic Offensive.
88 The area around Rzhev 
became known as the ‘Rzhev meat grinder’
89 because of the great number of Red 
Army soldiers killed there as they pushed the Germans away from Moscow. Details 
and accurate dates of the battles in these areas were not fully catalogued, and not 
much was known about them at all until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
However, the amount of casualties must have been enormous as the town of Rzhev 
and those surrounding it were completely destroyed.
90   
 
     Kleist’s First Panzer Group had not managed to take the Caucasus in November 
1941, and Timoshenko’s forces had pushed them back at Rostov-on Don due to their 
weakly guarded left flank held by Hungarian troops. Many of Kleist’s men were  
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suffering from frost-bite. Making matters worse, General Manstein’s 11th Army in 
the Crimea had not yet managed to seize Sevastopol. Hitler was infuriated, having 
expected both Moscow and the Caucasus to have been captured by this time.  
 
     On the German front there were many changes. In November, Field-Marshal 
Rundstedt had a heart attack on the way to the Caucasus, and was vilified by Hitler, 
for authorising Kleist with Army Group South to withdraw at Rostov in the bitter 
cold of November 1941. He resigned, and was replaced by Reichenau the 
commander of the 6th Army.
91 Reichenau was ordered to halt the retreat but was 
unable to. Rundstedt was forgiven by Hitler and sent home to Germany, but on sick 
leave. After having been recommended by Reichenau to Hitler, Friedrich Paulus was 
appointed to the position of Commander of the 6th Army on 6 January 1942, and on 
12 January his patron Reichenau died in a plane crash on his way back to Germany. 
Hitler had dismissed Guderian the Commander of Panzer Group Two in 
December1941, for protesting against his removal from the Moscow Front to Kiev. 
He had also been accused of withdrawal by Field Marshal von Kluge after Hitler sent 
orders against retreat.
92 Colonel-General Hoepner and Colonel-General Strauss 
commanders of the 4th Panzer and 9th Army had also been dismissed. Field Marshal 
Fedor von Bock was dismissed for medical reasons (but returned for later offensives 
in 1942), and Hitler, furious that his army had been unable to take Moscow removed 
Walther von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief on 19 December and took the 
position himself until the end of the war.
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During 1941 and early 1942, the replacement of Soviet equipment and weapons lost 
at the front was a growing problem, and production in an occupied country was 
impossible to keep up. Any Allied assistance (Lend-Lease from the United States of 
America and Britain), was most welcome, even if the amount of tanks did “not fully 
satisfy demands of weapons required by the character of military activity on the 
German-Soviet front.” Whilst not being the solution to the Red Army holding off the 
Wehrmacht at Moscow and Leningrad in late 1941, Allied aid certainly played a 
significant role in the fighting of November–December 1941, and a role which 
continued to be important in Soviet operations during the spring and summer of 
1942. Arctic convoys such as the PQ-12, sailed under the protection of destroyers 
from destinations like Loch Ewe in Scotland, and onto Reykjavik in Iceland headed 
for Murmansk, a port city in the extreme northwest of the Soviet Union. Vessels 
carried, among other equipment, planes like the British Hawker Hurricane fighter, 
the Curtis also known as the British ‘Kitty Hawk,’ Aerocobras, and Merlin engines, 
propellers, cartridges, mortar units, and even Studebaker jeeps and ‘International’ 
lorries. Murmansk was attacked by the Germans from Finland in 1941, but held out 
although it was almost destroyed and was awarded the honour of Hero City on 6 
May, 1965.
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     Zhukov wrote, that in view of the success of the counter-offensives along the 
fronts to the west, that the Soviet forces were to begin offensives on all other fronts. 
The objectives were to defeat the enemy at Leningrad west of Moscow and also in 
the South. The main attack was to be directed at Army Group Centre. The combined  
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forces of the Northwest, Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts were to form pinchers 
to trap the main forces of the Germans around Rzhev, Vyazma and Smolensk. 
Despite Zhukov’s reservations in a meeting with Stalin on 5 January that the 
offensives would not have enough artillery support to break through the enemy’s 
lines, and that the Red Army would be worn down and suffer unjustified heavy 
losses, the decision had already been made by the leader with the backing of 
Timoshenko, Beria and Malenkov.  
 
     After the meeting Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov said to Zhukov, “It was foolish to 
argue. The Chief had already decided.” Zhukov says he remarked, “Then why did he 
ask for my opinion?”
 95 While Stalin may have asked for advice from his 
contemporaries, his ego decreed that he would always make the final decision. The 
broad plan for an offensive on all fronts did not succeed due to the lack of the 
required manpower and the necessary arms, which resulted in enormous losses of 
Red Army troops. Several units were surrounded and annihilated, including two of 
Zhukov’s; Belov’s cavalry group and General Yefremov’s 33rd Army, were both 
trapped near Vyazma. Despite the victory at Moscow the Soviet troops were left 
tired, dispirited and short of arms, supplies, and transport.
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       On 1 January 1942 the ‘United Nations Declaration’, which was the basis of the 
future United Nations Organisation, was signed by twenty-six nations to agree to use 
all their means available to help fight the Axis powers and not to decide on a separate  
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cease-fire or peace, which improved the international position of the Soviet Union.
97 
Growing numbers of new tanks, planes, artillery pieces, rockets and munitions began 
to reach the Red Army.
98 Even though the Red Army’s winter counter-offensives 
drove the Germans from Moscow, Stalin still considered its defence a priority as the 
front line was still extremely close. In March 1942 Stalin called a conference which 
was held in the State Defence Committee in Moscow to discuss the future of the 
summer campaigns. According to Zhukov, this meeting was attended by Marshal 
Kliment Voroshilov, Marshal Semion K. Timoshenko, Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov, 
Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, Major- General I. Bagramyan, and himself. Zhukov 
affirms that during this conference Stalin, in a flood of overconfidence in the 
resources and position of the Red Army went against his advice and decided on a 
plan to attack the Germans in the south to try to retake Kharkov, which had been 
captured in late October 1941 after two months of bitter fighting by Timoshenko’s 
forces.
99  Zhukov states that Timoshenko was in agreement with Stalin’s plans. In 
September 1941, Stalin had made Budyenny a scapegoat for losing Kiev and 
dismissed him as Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front, replacing him 
with Timoshenko. Budyenny was then placed in charge of the Reserve Front.
100 
 
     Meanwhile, by early spring German morale was up, with the warm weather 
almost erasing memories of the bitter cold during the previous winter battles. On 5 
April Hitler’s Headquarters issued orders for the campaign to bring ‘final victory in 
the East.” Operation Northern Lights was to bring the siege of Leningrad to an end,  
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and Operation Blue would take place in the South. Bock, who had been reassigned, 
was not pleased about Hitler’s decision not to deploy reserves into the area, and 
wrote in his diary on 8 May, “My great concern – that the Russians might pre-empt 
us with their own attack...”
101 
 
     At dawn on 12 May Timoshenko launched his offensive with 640,000 men, 1,200 
tanks, 13,000 guns and mortars and 926 combat aircraft from around Volchansk. On 
14 May Timoshenko’s forces smashed through Sixth Army’s defences both North 
and South of Kharkov, the Ukrainian capital and fourth largest Soviet industrial 
centre. In seventy- two hours Paulus lost sixteen divisions taking a battering from all 
sides.
102 He appealed to Bock who was now commander of Army Group South, and 
asked for reinforcements and was sent the 23rd Panzer Division. Bock eventually 
convinced General Franz Halder, the German army’s Chief of Staff, that the situation 
at Kharkov was critical. Halder in turn appealed to Hitler, who immediately ordered 
the transfer to the Kharkov sector of every Air unit in the southern zone not already 
involved in critical combat duties.
 103 
     Apart from the few Lend-Lease planes that arrived from Murmansk, the Soviet 
fighter planes included a number of the effective new models, such as the Yakovlev 
Yak- 7B and the Lavotchikin La -5, but unfortunately the vast bulk were still old-
fashioned and inferior posing no real threat to the Luftwaffe’s newest machines. The 
Polikarpov I -153 Chaika (Gull), the I-15 Chato (Snub-nose) and the truncated I-167 
Rata (Rat) all dated from the Spanish Civil War. The first two, both biplanes were no  
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match for the strikingly superior German counterparts and even the latter, a 
monoplane of better design, usually came off worst in aerial combat. The Luftwaffe 
played a key role in smashing the major Soviet offensive around Kharkov. 4th Air 
Corps (Fliegerkorp IV) and elements of 8th Air Corps (Fliegerkorp VIII),   
commanded by General Field-Marshal Wolfram von Richtofen, who was a cousin of 
the infamous World War One flying ace, ‘The Red Baron,’ distinguished themselves 
in a series of non-stop defensive missions, greatly aiding the army as it fought back 
and destroyed the Soviet forces. From the onset of the battle at Kharkov German 
fighters controlled the airspace and shot down numerous Soviet aircraft. Assisting 
the struggle on the ground, dive bombers and bombers attacked with bombs and 
other weapons, smashing enemy assembly points, attacking tanks, batteries and 
columns.
104 
     Even though Timoshenko had opened up broad gaps in the North and South of 
Kharkov, and had created the right conditions for introducing the bulk of his army 
and mobile formations after two days of unchecked progress, he failed to seize the 
opportunity to throw his Corp effectively into the battle in order to complete an 
encirclement of the German forces around Kharkov. His plan had been to launch two 
convergent attacks with his South-western Front. His main force was Lt. General A. 
M. Gorodnyanskii's 6th Army and Major. General L. V.  Bobkin's, “Army Group.” 
They were to attack from the south of Kharkov in the Barvenkovo area. 28th Army 
and formations from 21st and 28th Armies were in the Volchansk area in the north. 
Both groups were to strike simultaneously towards the west and join behind Kharkov  
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where the pincers
105 were to make an effort to trap most of Paulus’s 6th Army. His 
force of twenty- three rifle divisions, two cavalry and two tank corps, outnumbered 
the German formations they opposed.
 106 
 
     Opposing Timoshenko’s forces, Kleist had struck at the southern side of the 
Barvenkovo salient before dawn on 17 May, advancing roughly sixteen kilometres 
before midday. His panzers had come upon strong resistance from Soviet T-34s and 
anti-tank guns and had to engage at close range otherwise their shells “bounced off 
like fireworks.”
107 In the words of a German observer, “The Russian tanks come out 
of their emplacements like tortoises, and try to escape by zigzagging. Some of them 
still wear their camouflage netting like green wigs.”
108 
 
     Timoshenko had asked for reinforcements to stop Kleist, and according to Nikita 
Krushchev, who was a political commissar at the time; Stalin would not allow him to 
withdraw. Krushchev commented at the Tenth Party Congress in 1956 in his 
indictment of the leader, “Contrary to common sense, Stalin rejected our suggestion 
and issued the order to continue the operation aimed at the encirclement of Kharkov, 
despite the fact that at this time many army concentrations were themselves actually 
threatened with encirclement and liquidation.”
109 Zhukov, whose statement backs up 
Khrushchev’s, says he was present during a phone conversation between Stalin and 
General Aleksandr Vasilevsky, the Acting Chief of General Staff  and said, “despite 
concerns and urgings to halt the Kharkov operation,” on 18 May, Stalin had   
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refused.
110Timoshenko called off the offensive on 19 May, but it was too late and in 
a bloody catastrophe, 250,000 Red Army men and women were trapped south of 
Kharkov between Kleist’s First Panzer Army and General Paulus’s Sixth Army.
111 
This is a prime example of Stalin’s tyrannical personality and belief in his military 
genius, causing senseless suffering to the soldiers of the Red Army.    
 
     For two weeks the trapped armies had fought back with ‘suicidal bravery,’ with 
tales emerging of women soldiers ‘hiding in straw and jumping out shooting at the 
enemy.’ Troops linking arms rushed enemy lines at night, only to be shot down in 
their thousands by German machine guns. Eventually the Soviet 6th and 57th Armies 
were massacred in what was to be later called ‘the Barvenkovo mousetrap.’ Only one 
in ten escaped. The Germans shot as many Red Army soldiers as they could; Boris 
Vitman, a Red Army soldier who was at the battle said, “I thought they were real 
butchers because they were still firing when there were so many dead. And I realised 
that they couldn’t take so many people prisoner, so they were trying to destroy as 
many of us as possible.”
 112 They did however take at least 240,000 Red Army 
prisoners, 2,000 guns, and the bulk of Timoshenko’s tank force, and despite losing 
20,000 troops; it was a great victory for the Germans in the Crimea. The prisoners 
were kept in barbed-wire enclosures guarded by SS soldiers, where the wounded 
were left to die, the political Commissars were taken away for questioning and Jews 
were shot.
113  
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     Timoshenko’s plan was ruined and this led to a German breakthrough in the 
South. Important areas of the Donets Basin were now in the enemy’s hands, and they 
were in an excellent position for staging Operation Blau (Blue), their future summer 
campaign. Soviet propaganda explained Timoshenko’s disastrous campaign in The 
History of the Great Patriotic War Volume II, an official Soviet history written post-
war in 1960, by stating that, “Timoshenko was misled by false intelligence reports 
stating Bock was concentrating a large Panzer force near Zmier, 25 kilometres south 
of Kharkov, and as a result delayed introducing his mobile formations which: 
‘negatively’ affected the development of the operation. By this time the enemy had 
succeeded in pulling up reserves and in organizing the rear area defences.”
114    
 
     The Germans held the Donbas (The Don River Basin region), and the Ukraine and 
now Hitler wanted to continue with his plan to seize oil in the south to supply his 
armies. He also aimed to attack armament factories, and secure a position on the 
Volga River at Stalingrad. The capture of Stalingrad itself was not his main objective 
at this point. He discussed his summer offensives with Hoth, Paulus, Bock, Kleist 
and Richtofen, in a conference at Poltava on 1 June 1942, the headquarters for Army 
Group South. The first stage of Operation Blue was to capture Voronezh and the 
second was to trap the bulk of the Red Army forces in a pincer movement west of the 
Don. The 6th Army was to move onto Stalingrad to secure the north-eastern flanks, 
while Kleist’s First Panzer Army and the 17th Army would occupy the Caucasus. On 
5 June the 6th Army started to move north-eastward to the Volchansk area, and by 10 
June companies from the 297th Infantry Division began to cross the Donets by  
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assault boats. High in spirits, due to the victory at Kharkov, Hitler was assured of his 
armies’ supremacy and consequent victory.
 115    
 
     On 19 June a German light aircraft was shot down just outside the German lines. 
Soviet soldiers discovered on one of the recovered bodies a document with the entire 
orders for Operation Blue. The body was later identified as Major Reichel, the 
operations officer of 23rd Panzer Division. Stalin with his usual paranoia dismissed 
the documents thinking that they were a trap by the Germans, whom he believed 
would again strike towards Moscow.
116 Once again Stalin had difficulty in 
overcoming his paranoia to be of any military use in the battle so far.  
 
     On 28 June the Germans attacked virtually along the whole of the southern front. 
2nd German Army and Hoth’s 4th Panzer attacked towards Voronezh, not north 
towards Orel and Moscow. Hoth’s panzer divisions advanced rapidly with 
Richtofen’s Stukas smashing strong points or tank concentrations ahead. Stalin sent 
more tank brigades from the Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka), reserve and also 
from Timoshenko’s South-Western Front, but due to communication problem they 
were delayed. On 30 June, Paulus’ 6th Army crossed the start line prepared on the 
eastern side of the river Donets with the Second Hungarian Army on its left flank and 
the very experienced First Panzer Army on its right.
 117 Many Red Army soldiers 
were cut off by the speedy advance and attacked from behind or from the flank. They 
often played dead until the Germans went to investigate, and then shot them at close 
range. But for the Soviets the chaos was so great owing to communication  
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breakdowns that staff officers and commanders had to fly around in biplanes, 
dodging the German Messerschmitts, to try to find their troops. 
118 
 
     The Soviet forces that opposed the Germans were hurriedly formed reserve 
armies, poorly trained, ill- equipped, and badly organised and the Germans 
overwhelmed and humiliated them, creating a mood of deep despair especially when 
the Russians realised that they were alone to endure the German onslaught. The 
anticipated Second Front which they had hoped that their allies would open in the 
summer of 1942 never eventuated, increasing the sense of terrible hopelessness. In 
the words of Gamlet Dallakian a Red Army soldier, “Smashed at Kharkov, bled 
white and forced to retreat to the Don, we thought that the war was lost and we could 
never withstand such a strong enemy. There seemed no way of stopping the 
Germans... they were breathing down our necks the whole time we were retreating 
towards the Don.
119  
 
     The Red Army made many mistakes as instructions arrived too late due to lack of 
equipment and training. During the retreat from Kharkov troops in some divisions 
were issued only two shells per day for inadequate battalion guns such as the 45 mm, 
which could only penetrate the German tanks at a distance of less than 100 metres. 
“We had little confidence in the effectiveness of such a weapon,” said Mikhail 
Borisov, the sole survivor of five different artillery crews. German Messerschmidt 
planes toyed with Soviet troops chasing and firing, then heading off, further  
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humiliating them.
120 It was dusty and burning hot, but the Germans were full of 
confidence. In the meantime, the Soviet troops felt an overwhelming spirit of 
inferiority, walking as if asleep, desperate and exhausted. Their morale had plunged 
to the deepest depths.  
 
     Hitler wanted to cut off Russia’s oil supplies from the Caucasus and also to cut 
off Lend-Lease supplies through Iran. He sent twenty-five divisions east. By July 
Soviet forces had been beaten back to the Don where many were trapped and 
drowned in the bend of the river. According to Alexander Fortov, an Artillery unit 
commander of 112
th Division, “There was constant bombing by the Germans, and in 
the chaos no food got through to us... we were trying to survive on emergency 
rations. And the heat was terrible. We found most of the wells dried out.”
121 
  
      The retreating Red Army was in chaos. Due to Stalin’s belief that Hitler’s main 
attack would be directed at Moscow, forces had been diluted in the South. The 
German armies were in high spirits marching along at 10 kilometres per hour in the 
spring weather, to keep pace with the motorised units. They had new equipment and 
morale was high after their victory at Kharkov. They raided everything in the 
villages they passed, from turnips and onions in vegetable gardens to chicken, geese, 
and ducks, leaving the peasants to starve to death. “Our lads have stolen three jugs of 
milk,” wrote a Hungarian soldier in his diary, after he and his companions had 
terrorised some local village girls.
 122 
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      Operation Blue: Second German Summer Offensive  June 28 - November 18, 1942 
 
 
The German losses sustained in the first year of warfare led to a less ambitious series of objectives 
being specified for the second summer campaign. Hitler's focus was on gaining control of the 
resources in the Caucasus. After the campaign was underway, the city of Stalingrad on the Volga 
became another objective. The extended left flank was eventually defended by relatively weak 
German allied armed forces from Rumania, Hungary and Italy.
123 
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     Hitler was desperate to get his forces to the Caucasus, to access the oil for his 
tanks, planes, and mobile units and to deprive the Red Army of the same. The 
collapse of Kharkov had made him overconfident and in his Directive No. 25 of 23 
July 1942, in a gigantic military blunder he insisted that the Caucasus and Stalingrad 
be attacked simultaneously. “In a campaign which has lasted little more than three 
weeks, the deep objectives outlined by me for the south flank of the Eastern Front 
have been largely achieved. Only weak enemy forces have succeeded in escaping 
encirclement and reaching the far bank of the Don.” He split Army Group South into 
two groups, A and B. Group A (Operation Edelweiss), was to head towards the South 
and capture the Caucasus, while Group B (Operation Fischreiher), named after the 
fish in the Volga, was to move towards Voronezh and Stalingrad.
124  
 
     This order caused a dilution of the German offensive because one of their 
strongest mobile formations was diverted away from Stalingrad. Against Halder’s 
advice, Hitler had sent 4th Panzer, which was originally on the left flank of the 
advance; southwards to Rostov, taking much needed mechanised support away from 
his infantry, because he thought that the 6th Army, being undefeated so far in battle, 
could secure Stalingrad on its own. Lieutenant Anatoly Mereshko, who would one 
day become Deputy Commander of the Warsaw Pact said, “Had the Panzer division 
been kept where it was supporting a direct attack on Stalingrad, I think the city 
would have fallen to the Germans in July 1942.” Hitler’s hubris and military blunder  
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in this situation was another quirk of fate that was to aid the Red Army in its struggle 
against the Germans.
125  
 
       Field Marshal List was to take Army Group A into the Caucasus and Field 
Marshal Baron von Weich was to command Army Group B, with the 6th Army being 
its largest formation. Hitler had changed the whole formation and timing of the 
original plans for Operation Blue. The ensuing traffic jam that occurred as the lines 
of the 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army crossed, caused a delay of two weeks, with 
the 4th Panzer commandeering most of the fuel.
126 Despite his objections, Manstein’s 
11th Army was withdrawn from the south and sent to Leningrad when Hitler  
reopened the northern offensive in an attack codenamed ‘Northern Lights.”Manstein 
said, “Could there be any justification for taking the 11th Army away from the 
southern wing...and employing it on a task which was palpably less important...”
127 
In early August, due to the slow progress of his objectives Hitler reverted back to the 
original plan and placed the 4th Panzer back to its position guarding the 6th Army’s 
left flank as they travelled towards Stalingrad. Time and effort was the price that the 
German armies had to pay as a consequence of Hitler’s lack of good military sense. 
 
     There was a danger that Stalingrad may not fall quickly and the longer it took, the 
more the Germans were putting themselves at risk of a counter-attack on their flanks. 
The inferior Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, Hungarian 2nd Army and Italian 8th 
Army on their flanks were unreliable and of a much weaker calibre than their  
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superior counterparts.
128 The German lines now extended an extra 400 kilometres 
than they did at the beginning of the summer offensives and they could not afford to 
place reserves behind the allied armies.
129  
 
The soldiers of the Red Army were desperate, struggling to get to Stalingrad in the 
heat and dust of the open steppe of the Don Basin. There was chaos, and the soldiers 
suffered from a lack of communications equipment, and ammunitions. They were 
tired, hungry, dispirited, frantic, and depressed, thinking that the end had come for 
them and the Soviet Union. A sense of failure spread through the ranks, and the 
confidence that had been built up after the victory at Moscow was rapidly 
disappearing. 
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Chapter 5 
 
At the Gates of Stalingrad 
 
 
There have probably been hundreds of books written about this battle. And I think 
that for as long as people will be living on this Earth, they will remember it. And this 
is not surprising, for it was the largest battle in military history, in which socialism 
and fascism came face to face. For us, it was life and death which met on the Volga. 
And it was life which won the fight.  
Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky
130 
  
 
The battle of Stalingrad began when units of the Soviet 62nd Army met the German 
6th Army on the River Chir, a tributary of the Don on 17 July 1942.
131 On that day 
40th Panzer Corps made a small encirclement of Red Army troops at Millerovo and 
instantly wheeled south-eastwards towards to Morozovsk leaving other German units 
to round up the Red Army soldiers they had captured. “We were starved to death,” 
recounted Stepan Odiniktsev, a clerk in the 60th Soviet Cavalry Division who was 
captured that day and crammed into an open wire cage with other Red Army troops. 
“On the best days we received a little rye in boiled water...we were constantly beaten 
with rifle butts.”  
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     On 19 July Stalin ordered the Stalingrad Defence Committee to prepare the city 
for war because of the rapid German advance. He feared Rostov would not hold out 
for long, and after fierce fighting in the city it fell on 23 July, but many Red Army 
soldiers escaped as the 64th Soviet Army was pushed back to the River Don.
132 “It 
was a time of terrible panic,” Red Army soldier Tamara Kalmykova remembered, 
“The commanders ran off first, the rest followed.” Stalin dismissed Major- General 
Kolpakchi the commander of the inexperienced 62nd reservist Army, on 27 July for 
over committing his troops and allowing the Germans to push back his unit to the 
main line of defence on the Don.
133 Stalin had to fly Colonel Zhuralev from the 
Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka), into the encirclement to take over.
134    
 
     As the Soviet forces fell further back, on 28 July Stalin issued the infamous 
decree 227 of “Not a step back,” (Ni Shagu Nazadi!). The order affirmed a lack of 
discipline in the troops and it gave permission for ‘backmarker’ divisions (which 
included tanks), to shoot ‘cowards and panic –mongers’ as traitors. Therefore, the 
Red Army not only had to contend with the fear of being killed by the Germans but 
also by their own government. Penal colonies were established, (shtrafriye) and also 
Barrage squads (zagraditelriye) were set up in the rear of ‘shaky’ divisions, which 
provided a heavy curtain of artillery fire directed in front of friendly troops to screen 
and protect them. Penal units were made up of soldiers who had made unsanctioned 
retreats, or were Gulag prisoners who were stripped of their medal and rank.
135 They 
were sent on the most dangerous and risky missions (such as mine clearing during an  
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attack), in the most treacherous areas, in order to repay their debt to the Motherland, 
usually in blood, but mostly in death. Soldiers caught retreating also had to contend 
with the knowledge that the Soviet state would make their families pay by depriving 
them of state allowances and assistance. Eventually they became the German’s worst 
nightmare as they had nothing more to lose.
136   
 
     With temperatures recorded up to ‘53 degrees in the sun’ and a huge water 
shortage the Germans continued advancing across the Don steppe. It was “as hot as 
Africa...with huge dust clouds” wrote General Strecker commander of German 11 
Corps. The Red Army polluted wells, poured petrol over grain, and adhered to the 
‘scorched earth’ policy on their retreat towards Stalingrad, depriving their enemies of 
much needed supplies. There was an increase of dysentery, typhus from lice, and 
paratyphus
137 In Cossack country the Germans fared better, as the inhabitants who 
were mostly anti-Soviet gave them eggs, salted cucumbers, milk, ham and even 
honey. Strecker remarked, “I’ve never eaten so much as here...we eat honey with 
spoons until we’re sick and in the evening we eat boiled ham.” 
 
     Hitler was now determined to capture Stalingrad. It was an important industrial 
centre and the Volga River on which it stood was a vital supply route from the 
Caucasus. Cutting oil supplies to Moscow and other northern cities via the river 
would weaken the Soviets even further. He may also have wanted to take the city due  
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Approach to Stalingrad 
By mid-August 1942, German armoured forces were pressing the Soviet armies defending the front 
before Stalingrad into the city itself. Panzers attached to 6th Army pushed east in conjunction with 4th 
Panzer Army striking northward.
138 
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to it being Joseph Stalin’s namesake, which would be a devastating blow to the 
morale of the Red Army and the Soviet people. The 4th Panzer Army and Paulus’ 
6th Army converged on the city, which was situated in a difficult position for the 
exhausted Red Army to defend, as the river Volga formed one natural barrier, and 
the Germans surrounded the city on the remaining three sides. On 23 August the 
Germans bombed Stalingrad with 600 bombers. “When the bombing began it was 
really horrible, said Albert Burkovski, who was only 14 at the time, “I can still 
remember the planes, the noise they were making, and it became real hell.”
139 
 
    180,000 civilian helped build rushed and crude defences, trenches, fire-points, and 
tank traps.
140 They were trapped anyway, as Stalin callously did not allow most of 
the people to evacuate in the early days of the attack. There were limited medical 
supplies in the city to cater for such a catastrophe, and orphaned children struggled to 
survive in the ruins of the city scavenging for food wherever they could. Some 
children on the west bank of the river helped transport wounded Red Army soldiers 
down to the landing stage by pushing them in carts. The battle was a combined effort 
at times, as the citizens did their best to help the Red Army defend the city.  
 
     Stalin ordered the Red Army to retain the Stalingrad bank of the Volga, by any 
means. The city had unexpectedly become the Soviet’s main objective, almost a 
focal point of the entire war.
141 Leading the German 6th Army was the refined and 
aristocratic Friedrich Paulus, while on the Soviet side was the tough, tactical General 
Vasily Chuikov. He was formerly appointed to the post of commander of the 62nd  
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Army on 10 September, being personally recommended by General Andrei 
Yeremenko to Stalin.
142 In his book Stalingrad the Fateful Siege, Antony Beevor 
depicts Chuikov as brutal and ruthless, who executed many Red Army soldiers, but 
Michael K Jones, who used Anatoly Mereshko as his military advisor for his book 
Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed, was told by the Soviet Lieutenant, who 
served with Chuikov at Stalingrad, that he was, “a man of incredibly strong will, very 
brave – almost desperately brave and I think that if someone else had been in charge 
– someone with a different temperament – it would not have been possible for us to 
hold Stalingrad... He had persistence and perseverance”
143 Another testimony to him, 
and this time to his humanity, was told by Mereshko,  
 
Officers received more butter, biscuits, and sugar...When Chuikov took command 
something astonishing happened. Commanders of units were strongly encouraged to 
bring their rations into the dugout and share it with their soldiers...In fact, over time, 
it was considered almost a criminal offence if an officer ate or smoked without 
sharing with his soldiers.  
 
Despite his perceived brutal nature, it would seem that deep down Chuikov had a 
heart for the common soldier, and it was that quality that helped him to keep up the 
morale and fighting spirit of the Red Army’s forces who were trapped in the city.   
 
     The morale and mood of the Soviet army changed at Stalingrad, which enabled 
the soldiers of the Red Army to bond, unite, and become motivated; this was a  
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critical change that helped them survive and eventually gain the victory. A tough, 
resourceful, and insightful leader like Chuikov was essential to that change.
 144 
Mereshko said that, “There was a special mood amongst our troops which came into 
being during the battle itself. Courage was the watchword under the command of 
Chuikov. Men were proud to be part of this army and their devotion led ordinary 
soldiers to perform extraordinary deeds.” A powerful bond of true comradeship grew 
between the Red Army soldiers trapped in Stalingrad during their time together. 
Those that survived fought side by side, day by day. They were able to get to know 
one another and care for each other’s welfare; which was a very different story to 
that on the steppes, were a soldier may never see the same face again.  
 
     Despite the fact that the Soviet communication system was extremely 
unsophisticated, the soldiers fought back hard.  Night raids, which the Germans 
hated, became popular with the Red Army soldiers due to numerous Luftwaffe 
attacks in daylight hours. Storm Groups were formed by Chuikov and General 
Alexander Rodimtsev, whose 13th Guards Division had been sent by Stavka to give 
vital support to the defenders, and whose intervention helped save the city.
145 These 
groups, usually consisting of only a handful of soldiers, became extremely popular as 
the soldiers were able to pick their own comrades and were able to look out for each 
other. Rank was not important either, with privates and lieutenants fighting side by 
side, and volunteers for this aggressive style of urban warfare were abundant. It 
consisted of close combat fighting with spades and knives and shocked and jolted the 
invaders out of their routine way of fighting.   
                                                           
144 Jones, Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed. P.80 
145 Jones, Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed P.94  
73 
     One particular raid became very famous and a tremendous morale boost to all Red 
Army soldiers who heard about it during the battle. It was the siege of what later 
came to be known as ‘Pavlov’s House.’ On 27 September, a reconnaissance unit led 
by Sergeant Jacob Pavlov cleared a house on Penzenskaya Street of its German 
inhabitants using grenades, which became the storm group soldier’s constant 
companion. The defence became a legend, as Red Army soldiers held out for over 
fifty days. It became a Stalingrad within Stalingrad and the positive psychological 
effects upon the defenders of the city were enormous. Chuikov stated that, “The 
soldier in a storm group must have initiative and boldness... rely on himself...and 
they feel that the commanders really trust them.”
146  
 
     The siege was even reported in the Soviet Press, and Pavlov was made a Hero of 
the Soviet Union. Other Red Army soldiers who were there say that the real hero of 
the siege was the inspirational Captain Naumov, who fought bravely by their side 
defending the house, which became part of an integrated defence line. He died in an 
attack over the road, at ‘The Mill House’ on 24 November, while Pavlov, after being 
wounded was carried away on a stretcher.
 The story that twenty-four brave Soviet 
multi-national Red Army soldiers hung on alone for fifty-eight days was propaganda, 
but was necessary at the time to give the impression of a cohesive national front, 
fighting on, not giving in, despite the almost impossible odds and hardships of the 
battle at Stalingrad.
147    
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     Street fighting was very important at Stalingrad; to survive the Red Army had to 
find a different system of fighting from the German’s. It transformed the 
psychological atmosphere of the battle and the common soldier gained a sense of 
hope and self belief. Urban guerrilla warfare that required hand-to-hand fighting, 
using knives and spades became the order of the battle. Clearing houses was 
dangerous work and Suren Mirzoyan, one of the survivors of Stalingrad said of his 
encounters with German soldiers during these terrifying operations, “...we had 
knives. I felt only one thing- kill, kill. A beast... If you were not strong enough 
physically, the German would have swallowed you.” 
148 These primitive and savage 
encounters were numerous and the Red Army soldier walked with death every day, 
but somehow they were in control of their own destiny during the siege of Stalingrad, 
more so than they had been during the total chaos of battles on the open fields of the 
plains and steppes. 
 
     Every building, factory, and street became a battlefield at Stalingrad and victory 
was measured in feet and yards. With buildings becoming fortresses equipped with 
anti-tank guns and mortars, and surrounded by barbed wire and minefields, Chuikov 
famously described the fortifications, “All these measures are aimed at making our 
defence unbreakable- for all the furious attacks of the Fascist troops will shatter upon 
these obstacles as sea waves are broken by granite rock.” By September the Germans 
had reached the Central Railway Station, located in the industrial area of Stalingrad 
near the west bank of the Volga. Chuikov and the men of the 62nd Army supported 
by Rodimtsev’s 13th Guard Division fought back and the commanders became an  
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inspiration to their men as they fought to hang onto the river bank, where Command 
Head Quarters was situated. Red Army soldiers who were on command there were 
completely fanatical and obsessed with their mission.
149 The German troops 
unprepared for hand-to-hand urban guerrilla warfare were always at a disadvantage 
as the Red Army was, at last, learning how to win.    
  
     The legend of Vasily Zaitsev the sniper is an integral part of the battle of 
Stalingrad. He was a young Siberian Red Army soldier from Batyuk, and was said to 
have started the ‘sniper movement’ in the besieged city but, although he was a skilled 
teacher, this is nonetheless propaganda as was Pavlov’s House. In his book Michael 
Jones, exposes the fact that it was actually Alexander Kalentiev, a communications 
officer who only lasted two months in Stalingrad before he was killed on 17 
November 1942, who inspired Zaitsev and others. ‘Sniperism’ emerged from this 
ordinary soldier’s desire to do something extraordinary to defeat the enemy. His 
commander had allowed him to go ‘hunting for Fritzes,’ and he managed to kill ten 
in two days hiding in the ruins of the buildings of the city. This practice had a huge 
impact on the other men and caught on like wildfire, with hundreds of Red Army 
 soldiers spontaneously volunteering.
 It gave the soldiers pride and purpose and an 
outlet for revenge.    
 
     The duel between Zaitsev and a German sharp-shooter on the Mamaev Kurgan 
that was depicted in the movie Enemy at the Gates, only lasted a few hours not days,  
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and there is no record of a special shooter being brought in from Berlin.
 150 
Nonetheless, Zaitsev who was credited with over 200 kills was made a Hero of the 
Soviet Union and inspired many. Chuikov supported the sniper movement as he saw 
it as psychologically uplifting for his troops and demoralizing for the Germans, 
saying “It will make every German feel he is living under the barrel of a gun.” He 
believed in and trusted these men, and Zaitsev expressed the fact that the key to the 
troops hearts was that trust. These close bonds that developed between Red Army 
soldiers in the ruined city of Stalingrad as they struggled to survive were the essence  
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    The Battle of Stalingrad 
As German armed forces pressed forward into the city of Stalingrad during September, they 
encountered increasingly effective resistance from the defending Soviet troops. Within Stalingrad, 
various complexes became battlegrounds.
151 
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of a change that came over the Soviet army that enabled them to eventually rise up 
and become the victors in this horrific war. 
 
     A key strategic position in the city of Stalingrad was the Mamaev Kurgan, a great 
hill that dominated the city and gave a clear view of its surrounds and was called 
Height 102 on the Soviet Army’s maps. 
152From its heights could be seen the 
Stalingrad Tractor Factory, where the superb T-34 tanks were still being built and 
repaired, (and were often driven straight out to the battlefields beyond the city by the 
workers themselves), the Barrikady Gun Factory which became one of the last strong 
holds in the battle and the Red October (Krasnyi Oktiabr’) steel plant. The hill was 
steeped in history, and was reputed to be an old Tartar burial ground.
153 Both sides 
fought fiercely for possession of this mound which gave both a tactical and a 
psychological advantage. The Red Army defenders of Stalingrad believed that if they 
lost it they would lose the battle, and it became a terrible contest of brutality and 
stubbornness to gain and hold the hill. “We decided we would hold onto the Mamaev 
Kurgan whatever happened,” said Chuikov.
154 It changed hands many times during 
the battle, and was bombarded so much by the Luftwaffe, some places on the hill 
bore more metal than dirt.
155 
 
     From the middle of September throughout October the German infantry tried to 
push General Chuikov’s 62nd Army out of the ruins of the city and into the Volga. 
Eventually the 62nd Army’s hold was reduced to bridgeheads on the steep river  
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bank. There the defenders dug in, supported by Soviet reinforcements and masses of 
artillery sited on the far shore. Although Chiukov’s unit was the most famous 
involved in the battle of Stalingrad because it was inside the city, it was only one of 
four armies in General Yeremenko’s Stalingrad Army Group. General Tolbukhin and 
his forces were positioned south of the city on the right bank of the Volga, and in the 
north was General Rokossovsky’s Don Army Group. On 19 November, as the winter 
set in, the Soviet forces outside Stalingrad city began an encirclement of the German 
6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army in Operation Uranus.
156 
 
     Operation Uranus became the Soviets major victory and was inspired by the 
German’s own encirclement tactics mounted in 1941. Tukhevachsky’s denounced 
‘Deep Operations’ were at last brought back by Zhukov and Vasilevsky and with 
Stalin’s approval, as he began to listen to his military tacticians. Strategic decision 
making was critical during the period of October 1942 through to November 1943. 
During this period Stavka overcame the lack of realism that was so characteristic of 
its earlier planning, and began planning a more stable course for its continuing 
campaigns. The main thrust was to be on the less superior forces of the Romanians, 
Hungarian, and Italian soldiers who were positioned on the flanks of the German 
armies.
157 Secret operations ensued, and the Soviets now showed a talent for military 
deception. They camouflaged tanks, and loaded them onto railway trucks headed for 
‘a secret destination,’ not even known by the commander of the brigade who 
escorted them. On 24 October they were unloaded at Kamulka station, north of  
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Operation Uranus: November 19, 1942 - February 6, 1943 
As the German 6th Army continued its battle of attrition to capture Stalingrad, the Soviet 
military command prepared to launch a counteroffensive (Operation Uranus) that aimed to 
encircle the German army fighting in Stalingrad and bring about the collapse of southern 
wing of the German front.
158 
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Stalingrad and were slowly driven in the dark supervised by Zhukov himself. “Then 
you could hear voices saying, Zhukov! Zhukov! , and I could recognise Zhukov with 
a group of Generals,” recalled Ivan Golokolenko, an officer in the 5th Tank Army 
who took part in Operation Uranus. 
 
     A third and secret army Group, the Southwestern, made up of the 21st, 63rd 
Armies, and the 5th Tank Army led by General Vatutin, had been deployed west of 
Rokossovsky’s forces on the upper Don. On 19 November Uranus began with an 
artillery barrage that concentrated all its firepower in one area, which was a new and 
‘Germanic’ way, for Red Army tactics. The main thrust of Operation Uranus was 
west of the Don River, over 150 kilometres away from Paulus’ group. Cutting 
through Romanian positions, the Axis forces weak spot, and bypassing enemy strong 
points, Vatutin’s mobile forces wheeled around Stalingrad, only 160 kilometres west 
of the city.
159 The Romanians had not been well equipped by the Germans especially 
in anti-tank guns and 27,000 soldiers were taken prisoner on the first day of the 
Soviet operation.
160 Soviet strategy had improved in what the Soviets called the 
‘Second Period of the war,’ from 19 November 1942- December 1943.
161 
 
     By now it was snowing and the temperatures had dropped considerably making 
the Germans and their allies as miserable as they had been the previous winter. The 
Romanians were not as motivated as the Germans in this war, and had been treated 
very badly by their superior allies. Romanian soldiers and horses received less  
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Operation Winter Storm: Attempt to Relieve 6th Army Battle of 
Stalingrad: December 12-18, 1942 
 
German armed forces of Army Group Don made an unsuccessful attempt break through and relieve 
the German 6th Army encircled in Stalingrad. Soviet military resistance proved too great to overcome 
with the German units available and the great 6
th Army remained isolated.
162 
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rations than the Germans. Also language barriers hindered the allied forces from 
making any true bonds, and the Romanians and Hungarians were not on good terms. 
These problems did not give Germany’s allied forces much motivation or build 
morale in their ranks. Although they fought bravely they were unable to defend the 
German armies as well as they could have.
163  
 
     A southern pincher, from the left flank of Yeremenko’s Stalingrad Army Group, 
attacked on 20 November. The two Soviet spearheads met near Kalach in the middle 
Don River on the 24th. Paulus’ 6th Army was trapped with 330,000 men 
164in what 
the Germans termed, the Cauldron (Der Kessel).
165 The previous tactics of surprise 
and lightning attacks did not exist in the German armies any more. Paulus was a 
hesitant leader always looking for Hitler’s guidance, but the Fuehrer had chosen the 
worst possible time to leave his headquarters in East Prussia, and was staying at the 
Berghof in southern Bavaria.
166 The Red Army had come a long way tactically, “We 
felt inspiration...we felt confidence that we were capable of beating the enemy 
successfully, and this operation remained the most memorable-the brightest-event. I     
remember I felt as if I had wings, I felt as if I was flying. Before that I used to feel 
depressed...” said Golokolenko. As the strategic tactics of the Soviets improved, and 
they learnt the art of deception, so did their morale increase.  
 
     After he found out what had happened Hitler told Paulus to stay put and make no 
attempt to break out of the Cauldron. Goring boasted that his Luftwaffe would  
                                                           
163 Beevor, Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege Pp.249-250 
164 Ibid,161; Baker, The Second World War on the Eastern Front  P.66  
165 Ibid,161 
166 Rees, War of the Century P.180  
84 
supply the 6th Army by an ‘air bridge,’ as they had done earlier at Demyansk in 
1941.
167 General Field Marshal Eric von Manstein was ordered to attack from the 
south-west of the front to cut a relief corridor through the Soviet encirclement, and 
relieve Paulus’ army. His Operation Winter Tempest began on 12 December and 
pushed on through the snow into the Soviet ring around Stalingrad giving the 
German troops hope. But the Soviets had placed 60 Divisions inside the encirclement 
and Manstein could not carry out his task having to withdraw in late December.  
 
     German Airlift could not drop the required amount of food and equipment to keep 
an army the size of the 6th going, and sometimes the wind blew supplies into Soviet 
territory. The trapped German army had no food, were covered in lice, and were 
freezing to death. In the words of Berhard Bechler a German soldier, “We were just 
lying there, without food, almost frozen to death, it was dreadful...it was minus 20 or 
30 degrees, we were lying in dugouts in the snow.” The Handbook of Military 
Psychology states that humans who are subjected to ‘environment stress’ such as 
combat stress (CSR) that taxes or surpasses the person’s resources and threatens their 
well- being can be affected in their task performance, have decreased attention, 
degraded problem solving and even lowered immunity to disease. 
168 The German 
6th Army could not function properly as human beings during this horrific time, let 
alone as an efficient fighting force. Men raved wildly in their bunks and some lay 
there howling. 
169At its worse point the situation culminated in the scenario where 
each German soldier had no more than 20 grams of food per day.
170 Abandoned in a  
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strange country, missing family, and slowly starving to death, all hope gone of 
victory, some officers in the 6th Army committed suicide over Christmas and New 
Year.
171  
 
     On 23 November Paulus sent a message to Army Group B which was forwarded 
onto Hitler, “Murderous attacks on all fronts...  Arrival of sufficient air supplies is not 
believed possible, even if weather should improve. The ammunition and fuel situation 
will render the troops defenceless in the very near future... Paulus.” Hitler denied 
Paulus any freedom of movement or decision, in a message headed ‘Fuhrerbefehl’, 
the highest priority Fuhrer Decree, and robbed the 6th Army of any chance to escape 
during the time the Soviets were trying to strengthen their hold around the pocket.
172       
 
     A Soviet assault that began on 25 November, codenamed Operation Mars, tried to 
drive back the remaining German forces that were left over from the battle of 
Moscow, in the area that was called ‘the Rzhev salient.’ Despite Lieutenant- General 
Ivan Konev’s best efforts this manoeuvre was a disaster for the Red Army, and that 
humiliating fact was a well guarded secret until 1999.
173 Operation Little Saturn on 
16 December had better results, and the Red Army attacked the Germans near the 
Chir and Don Rivers, virtually destroying the Italian army.
174 As Paulus’ 6th Army 
slowly died of starvation and disease, on 24 January the last German airfield in the 
encirclement fell to the Red Army as the Soviets tightened the ring around the city of 
Stalingrad.  
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     Hitler responded by making Paulus a Field-Marshal on 30 January, because no 
German field-marshal had ever been captured or had surrendered, and he expected 
him to commit suicide. Instead he emerged from his basement headquarters at the 
Stalingrad Department Store (Univermag), and did surrender on 31 January 1943, 
telling Gerhard Hindenlang, one of his battalion commanders, “I am a Christian... I 
refuse to commit suicide.”
175 An entire Axis field army had been trapped, 
commanded by a field marshal and with five corps head quarters, 22 German 
divisions and many troops from the Axis allies. The disaster was unprecedented in 
the history of the German Army.
 176 
 
      On February 1942 the remnants of the German forces in the city were surrounded 
and Chuikov supervised the bombardment himself. They surrendered at midday, and 
it marked the end to the battle of Stalingrad. Mereshko remarked that, “The sudden 
silence was overwhelming, and some of our soldiers, habituated to the constant din 
of fighting, couldn’t stand it...men were shooting rifles, letting off grenades, just to 
relieve the tension.”
177  
 
    The last pocket of resistance surrendered on 3 February, and 90,000 German 
troops went into captivity, many never returning home. Soviet operations continued 
to push the Germans back from their positions on the front and in February 1942 the 
Red Army recovered territory in the Don River Basin. By 14 February Kharkov had 
been set free of German rule, only to be recaptured by Mantein’s counter-offensive. 
But the Red Army had ‘learnt to fight,’ and the German forces were suffering heavier  
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losses than they had ever anticipated.
178 The Red Army had shown courage and 
resilience during the battle of Stalingrad and continued on in that strain at the battle 
of Kursk, in July 1943, which was a mighty victory for the Soviets. They showed 
that they could defeat the Germans, and they eventually drove them all the way back 
to Berlin 
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Conclusion 
  
The Red Army of the Soviet Union that had struggled from its very inception with 
hardships from every quarter, were eventually able to rise up and defeat an enemy far 
superior than itself in battle strategy and experienced soldiers. Despite the purges of 
the 1930s and the immense numbers of imprisoned and executed Red Army officers, 
a few excellent men arose who were able to lead their men to victory. Enforced 
battle, with the fear of being shot by their own government was a huge incentive at 
times to make a soldier fight, and they were not always as courageous as the Soviet 
Union propaganda machine made out. But despite huge losses and everything that 
the enemy and Stalin threw at them, the men and women of the Red Army somehow 
survived.  
 
     The Battle of Stalingrad lasted 200 days and ranged over 100,000 square 
kilometres. Over two million participants employed some 26,000 field guns and 
mortars, as well as 20,000 tanks and as many aircraft. German losses totalled 1.5 
million (killed, wounded and taken prisoner), which was one quarter of its total 
Eastern Front forces. Over sixty divisions were destroyed at Stalingrad and a three 
day period of mourning was declared in Germany.    
 
Despite many initial setbacks in 1941, the soldiers of the Red Army managed to 
emerge as the victors in Nazi Germany’s siege of Stalingrad. The bonds that the 
soldiers of the Red Army formed at Stalingrad, in the most horrifying of 
circumstance, were the most important weapon that they had. It was this spirit of  
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comradeship that helped them to survive and gain the victory. General Chuikov’s 
courage and steadfastness as he fought side by side his fellow soldiers was an 
inspiration to his troops. He shared his food with his troops, slept in the same 
trenches with them, and encouraged other commanders to do the same, until they all 
looked upon each other as equal. In return the troops wanted to fight as hard as they 
could and did not want to let their superiors down.
179 The legends of Stalingrad will 
always fascinate and intrigue us, but the real truth is the most shocking and awe 
inspiring story of World War Two. How the Red Army managed to survive in a city 
that was in ruins and hold out for so long still mystifies us.  
 
    Joseph Stalin, one of the most ruthless and stubborn tyrants in history, learnt at last 
to listen and heed the advice of others, such as the brilliant military tactician, 
Marshal Georgy Zhukov. The inclusion of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky’s deep 
battle tactics, that had been missing for so long from the Red Army, and introducing 
deceptive strategy during the battle, ensured victory at last, for the besieged city and 
its long-suffering troops and citizens. Adolf Hitler made some terrible blunders 
during the war with the Soviets, which helped bring himself and his whole country to 
its knees. The environment of the Soviet Union also had its role to play in the battle 
against the Axis forces, as rain, mud, heat, freezing cold temperatures and snow, 
were at times the deciding factors of who would live and who would die.   
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General Vasily Chuikov is buried at the Mamaev Kurgan, as are many Red Army 
soldiers who fought on that sacred mound. The story of the 62nd Army and the 13th 
Guards Army is the story of Stalingrad; and they stopped the German army from 
reaching the Volga. If the German armies had captured the city it would have been a 
tremendous psychological blow to the Soviet Union, one from which it may not have 
recovered. The Red Army survived despite its difficult beginning in 1918, and the 
long years of lack of funds, good military training, and experienced officers, to gain 
the victory in the bloodiest battle in history, the battle of Stalingrad.  
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Appendices 
Number One 
 
Order No. I of the Petrograd Soviet, March 14, 1917  
March 1 (14), 1917.  
To the garrison of the Petrograd District. To all the soldiers of the Guard, army, artillery and fleet for 
immediate and precise execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for information.  
The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has decided:  
1. In all companies, battalions, regiments, depots, batteries, squadrons and separate branches of military 
service of every kind and on warships immediately choose committees from the elected representatives of the 
soldiers and sailors of the above mentioned military units.  
2. In all military units which have still not elected their representatives in the Soviet of Workers' Deputies 
elect one representative to a company, who should appear with written credentials in the building of the State 
Duma at ten o'clock on the morning of March 2.  
3. In all its political demonstrations a military unit is subordinated to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Deputies and its committees.  
4. The orders of the military commission of the State Duma are to be fulfilled only in those cases which do 
not contradict the orders and decisions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.  
5. Arms of all kinds, as rifles, machine-guns, armoured automobiles and others must be at the disposition and 
under the control of the company and battalion committees and are not in any case to be given out to officers, 
even upon their command.  
6. In the ranks and in fulfilling service duties soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline; but 
outside of service, in their political, civil and private life soldiers cannot be discriminated against as regards those 
rights which all citizens enjoy.  
Standing at attention and compulsory saluting outside of service are especially abolished.  
7. In the same way the addressing of officers with titles: Your Excellency, Your Honor, etc., is abolished and 
is replaced by the forms of address: Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc.  
Rude treatment of soldiers of all ranks, and especially addressing them as "thou," is forbidden; and soldiers 
are bound to bring to the attention of the company committees any violation of this rule and any 
misunderstandings between officers and soldiers.  
This order is to be read in all companies, battalions, regiments, marine units, batteries and other front and rear 
military units.   
92 
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Number Two 
Trotsky’s Order Number 65 (sic) 
1. Every scoundrel who incites anyone to retreat, to desert or not to fulfil a military 
order, is to be shot.  
2. Every soldier of the Red Army who voluntarily deserts his post is to be shot. 
3. Every soldier who throws away his rifle or sells part of his uniform is to be shot.  
4. Battle –police units are to be stationed along the entire front-line zone, in order to 
catch deserters. Any soldier who tries to offer resistance to these units is to be shot 
on the spot. 
5. All local soviets and Committees of the Poor, are obligated, on their part, to take 
all measures to catch deserters. Deserter-hunts are to be carried out twice in every 24 
hours, at 8 am. And 8pm. Captured deserters are to be handed over to the 
headquarters of the nearest unit or to the nearest military commissariat.   
6. Persons guilty of harbouring deserters are liable to be shot.  
7. Houses in which deserters are found are to be burnt down.  
Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, vol. 1, 487-8.  
Commanders seldom enforced such draconian measures. Most often, when deserters 
were apprehended they were simply assigned to duty in a different unit.  
Number Three 
The original signatories were:  
Big Four: United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, Republic of China 
British Commonwealth: Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa. 
Other Powers: Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama.   
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In Exile: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Yugoslavia. 
Number Four. 
 
                                A Pincer strategic movement 
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